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ABSTRACT
Castillo, Marcelo J. PhD, Purdue University, August 2016. Essays in International
Migration . Major Professor: Chong Xiang.
This dissertation consists of three essays examining the effects of high-skilled immigration on various economic outcomes within the receiving country. In the first
essay, I study how skilled immigrants affect wages and employment in US industries
during 1995-2007, using novel microdata on approved H-1B visas. These data show
that most H-1B employers specialize in the production of high-skilled services used as
inputs by other businesses. In light of this, I consider the downstream effects of skilled
immigrants on industry labor market outcomes: how wages and employment in an
industry respond to immigration shocks to its suppliers. The identification strategy
relies on large policy changes to the annual limit on H-1B admissions. I find that
higher admissions lead to higher mean wages in exposed downstream industries. Also
rising with downstream exposure are the wages of high-skilled, STEM, and low-skilled
workers, and the employment of high-skilled and STEM workers. These findings indicate that higher admissions increase average wages by increasing worker compensation
but also by changing the composition of employment in exposed industries. While
immigration status is not observable in my data, my estimates suggest that higher
admissions benefit US native workers because exposed downstream sectors hire few
immigrants.
In the second essay, I use the administrative data mentioned above to examine
how skilled immigrants affect the employment prospects of young skilled natives in
US states during 2000-2009. My identification strategy uses a decline in the supply of
visas to a state caused by (1) changes in national immigration policy, and (2) tougher
competition in the market for visas as demand by the largest H-1B employer increased

ix
dramatically. I show robust evidence that increased hiring of skilled foreign workers
lowers employment of young college-educated natives. Consistent with previous work,
I find no effect on total college-educated employment.
In the last chapter, I consider how rising skilled immigration during 1995-2007
affected service offshoring in US industries. Using the H-1B microdata, I document
a large increase in the employment of skilled immigrants in tradeable service sectors
during 1995-2007. Because skilled immigration may be endogenous to offshoring, I
develop instruments that use variation in H-1B inflows that depend on (1) the annual
limit on H-1B admissions set by government policy and (2) US macroeconomic conditions. These national shocks have differential effects across industries because some
industries are always more exposed to skilled immigration than others. I find that
higher skilled immigrant flows lead to higher offshoring in highly exposed industries.

1

1. HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRANTS, WAGES AND
EMPLOYMENT IN US INDUSTRIES
1.1

Introduction
A significant portion of the skilled immigrants that join the US labor market do so

through the H-1B visa program. In regards to the regulation of the program, there is
much public debate as to whether an increase in the annual cap on admissions would
prove beneficial to US workers. Arguments on both sides tend to center around how
the hiring of H-1Bs affects the opportunities of US workers within a firm (Pekkala
Kerr, Kerr, and Lincoln 2014). Noting that H-1Bs are primarily employed in STEM
occupations1 —a critical input to technology creation and dissemination—proponents
argue the cap is too low, preventing US firms from hiring the workers they need to
innovate (Gates 2008). A low cap curtails innovation by US firms and thus reduces
employment prospects for US natives. Conversely, opponents claim such a shortage
does not exist, but rather that firms prefer to hire foreign workers to cut labor costs
(Matloff 2003; Hira 2010). In seeking to advance the public debate, a recent body
of academic literature evaluates the impact of skilled immigrants on US workers by
focusing on their effects on the receiving firm.23 While it is clearly important to
understand how immigrants directly affect employment outcomes within a firm, a
focus solely on the firm overlooks supplier-buyer links that exist between firms. These
economic linkages can transmit shocks affecting a particular firm to other firms in their
1

STEM occupations require training in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics.
See Pekkala Kerr, Kerr, and Lincoln 2014; Ghosh, Mayda, and Ortega 2014; and Doran, Gelber,
and Isen 2014.
3
An important parallel literature takes the city as the unit of analysis (see Peri, Shih, and Sparber
2014, 2015). These studies may capture downstream effects to the extent that H-1B firms interact
with businesses based on location. Nonetheless, as noted in Pekkala Kerr, Kerr, and Lincoln (2014),
top H-1B employers operate across different regions. It is reasonable to assume their supply chains
will extend across multiple regions as well.
2

2
supply chain. The findings of this study suggest that the indirect effects of skilled
immigration are at least as important as the direct effect studied in the current
literature.
In this paper, I study the downstream effects of skilled immigrants on the US
labor market. That is, how labor conditions in an industry respond to immigration
shocks to its upstream suppliers. In particular, I quantify the downstream effects
of changes in H-1B employment from 1995 to 2007. To identify these effects, I use
instruments that capture variation in H-1B employment caused by policy changes to
the annual cap on admissions. During 1995–2007, the US Congress raised the cap
from 65,000 visas per year to a high of 195,000 and then lowered it to the original
65,000. In the sectors most exposed to the program, variation in the cap led to large
changes in the employment of foreign workers. Measuring these changes requires
data on the employment and wages of H-1B workers by industry-year. However,
government agencies do not report industry-level summaries, and the administrative
data needed to generate the summaries are not publicly available.4 Under a Freedom
of Information Act Request to the US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), I
obtain microdata on approved H-1B visas. To measure downstream shocks, I combine
the H-1B data with intermediate input usage by industry from input-output accounts.
Though perhaps not evident at first glance, shocks to H-1B employers are likely
to have strong consequences downstream. From the USCIS data, we find that most
H-1B industries are skilled labor intensive service sectors that supply intermediate
inputs to a wide range of businesses throughout the economy. The professional and
business services (PBS) sector obtains over two-thirds of H-1B visas with around 60%
of all petitions granted to firms in information technology (IT) consulting, engineering services, R&D services, and management consulting.5 As their name suggests,
PBS firms specialize in the production of services used as inputs by other businesses.
4

Because these administrative records were not made available until recently, most of the previous
literature has not used this rich data source. Exceptions are recent working papers by Doran, Gelber,
and Isen, 2014, and Peri, Shih, and Sparber, 2015.
5
In the next section, I document the sectoral composition of H-1B workers in more detail.

3
Berlingieri (2014) reports that in 2002, firms consumed 83% of gross PBS output as
intermediate inputs compared to only 44% of the output of the average sector. Moreover, business services are general purpose inputs and thus are used by a wide range
of businesses throughout the economy.67 The fact that PBS firms use high-skilled
labor intensively compounds the prospect of strong downstream effects. Because production relies heavily on high-skilled labor, a higher supply of skilled foreign workers
can meaningfully increase output supply in these sectors, and improve the economic
opportunities of their downstream customers.
While immigration shocks likely improve profitability in downstream industries,
the effect on labor demand is unclear. To illustrate this point, I sketch a simple
model to describe how upstream shocks affect labor demand downstream. Assume
we have a single upstream sector that transforms H-1B labor into an intermediate
input. Downstream industries combine these inputs with domestic labor to produce
final goods. An increase in H-1B admissions boosts intermediate output supply and
propagates downstream in the form of a lower price. The fall in price has two opposing
effects on downstream labor demand, and the sign of the total effect depends on
which of the two effects is stronger. First, there is a negative effect based on the
substitutability between labor and intermediates. The fall in price lowers production
costs, however, allows the industry to expand and thus increases demand for all
inputs. The model also predicts a larger downstream effect for industries that use
intermediates more intensively. This prediction motivates how I measure downstream
shocks to an industry: I first multiply the direct shocks to the industry’s suppliers by
their share in total intermediate input costs, and then sum across all suppliers. My
6

As discussed in Acemoglu et al.(2012), in the US economy a small set of industries play a key role
as intermediate input suppliers. Berlingieri (2014) documents the evolution of forward linkages—a
metric of the importance of a sector in the supply chain—for the US economy during the 19482002 period. In the past several decades, business services has become the sector with the highest
forward linkage becoming more influential than other traditionally well-connected sectors such as
transportation.
7
Since H-1Bs are highly concentrated in a few industries, but their employers supply a great number
of sectors, many of the of the most exposed industries downstream hire few or no H-1B workers
directly, including many four-digit NAICS industries in wholesale, retail, mining, and other business
services.

4
empirical approach relates these shocks with annual changes in industry log wages
and log employment.
I begin my analysis using data on average wages and employment from the Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) program administered by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The sample consists of 137 LPC industries from 1995 to 2007. I
find a positive and statistically significant downstream effect on average wages. A
one standard deviation increase in downstream exposure increases wage growth in an
industry by .44 percentage points. In the period from 2000 to 2001, the increase in
wages is 1 percentage point higher for an industry in the 80th percentile of exposure
than for an industry in the 20th percentile. The results are robust to controlling for
industry output and pre-trends in wages, IT capital intensity, and even more demanding industry-specific time trends. I find no evidence of downstream effects on total
employment.
A disadvantage of the LPC data is that its industry coverage misses the great
majority of H-1B employment, and thus I cannot estimate the direct impact of skilled
immigration shocks. While the main contribution of this paper is to account for
downstream effects—since direct effects are already studied in other settings—it is
useful to estimate both effects to compare their economic magnitude. To estimate
direct effects, I extend the analysis using data from the Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES) program.8 The OES samples more industries than the LPC and
includes most H-1B employers. I find a positive direct effect on average wages albeit
less than half of the magnitude of the indirect effect. A one standard deviation
increase in direct exposure increases wage growth in an industry by .18 percentage
points.
The estimated downstream effect on average wages suggests that lifting the current level of the cap would benefit US workers. Such policy recommendation may
be misleading if for example, skilled immigration strongly harms certain groups of
workers but benefits other groups in a way such that its total effect on average wages
8

The OES is also administered by the BLS.

5
is positive. To address this possibility, using occupational data on wages and employment from the OES, I examine how downstream effects vary with worker characteristics. I find that the wages of high-skilled, STEM, and low-skilled workers rise with
downstream exposure. On the employment side, I find positive effects for high-skilled
and STEM workers. These findings suggest that higher admissions increase average
wages by increasing worker pay but also by changing the labor composition of exposed
downstream industries towards high-skilled and STEM employment. Lastly, I find
a strong direct impact on the employment of high-skilled and STEM workers. This
finding indicates that average wages increase in directly exposed industries mostly
through changes in the employment mix.
This paper fits into the larger high-skill immigration literature that examines the
effect on other outcomes such as innovation and productivity (Kerr and Lincoln 2010,
Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010, and Moser, Voena, and Waldinger 2012, Borjas
and Doran 2012).9 More broadly, I add to the literature that studies the labor
market effects of immigrants.10 My contribution is to account for an indirect effect
of immigration that takes place because of the interconnection of industries through
input-output linkages. In its account of indirect effects, this paper is similar to Cortes
(2008) who argues that low-skill immigration to a city lowers the prices of unskilledintensive sectors and indirectly benefits consumers of these goods.
This paper is also related to industry and firm level studies that explore how foreign workers affect domestic labor markets through input trade and offshoring (e.g.,
Feenstra and Hanson 1997,1999; Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright 2013; Hummels, Jorgensen, Munch, and Xiang 2014; Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan and Phillips 2014).11
I complement this literature by accounting for the role of foreign workers in the domestic sourcing of intermediate inputs. My employment results are consistent with
Crino (2010)—and with most of the literature on offshoring—who finds that service
9

See surveys by Nathan(2013), Kerr (2013) and Chapter 8 in Borjas(2014)
The seminal contributions are Card (2001) and Borjas(2003). See also surveys by Friedberg and
Hunt (1995), Lewis and Peri (2014), and Chapters 3-6 in Borjas (2014).
11
See Feenstra and Hanson (2003) , Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan (2011) and Hummels, Munch,
and Xiang (2014) for surveys on offshoring and labor markets.
10

6
offshoring increases employment in skilled versus less skilled occupations. In this
study, however, I find evidence that the wages of low-skill workers are positively
affected, which is an unusual finding in the literature on globalization.12
Lastly, this paper is related to a recent empirical literature that quantifies the impact of shocks that originate in some US industries and propagate to others through
the input-output network. Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price (2015) show
evidence that increased exposure to imports from China in some manufacturing sectors has effects on employment in industries not directly exposed to import competition. In addition to Chinese import shocks, Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr (2015)
consider the propagation of three other types shocks: changes in spending by the federal government, shocks to total factor productivity, and changes in patenting rates
by foreign countries. They find that the network effects are larger than the direct
impact of the shocks. I extend this literature by estimating downstream effects for a
different type of industry shock: skilled immigration shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the H-1B
program and describes the data used in the study. Section 3 discusses the model,
how to measure downstream shocks, and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents
the results and various robustness exercises. Section 5 concludes.

1.2

H-1B Visa Background and Data Sources

1.2.1

H-1B Visa Background and Data

The H-1B visa grants temporary working rights to high-skill foreign workers, with
most H-1B recipients having at least a bachelor’s degree.13 In general, more than half
of successful applicants are in Science and Engineering or computer related professions
(Kerr and Lincoln, 2010). The program came into effect under the Immigration Act
12

This discrepancy, however, may take place because I include in my analysis many non-traded
sectors (e.g. wholesale and retail), which are intensive in low-skilled labor but also in intermediate
service inputs.
13
In general, more than half of successful applicants are in Science and Engineering or computer
related professions (Kerr and Lincoln, 2010).

7
of 1990. At this time, the US Congress set a cap of 65,000 on the number of new visas
to be issued in any given fiscal year (FY). Figure 1.1 shows the numerical cap and the
approximate number of cap-bound visas issued in each fiscal year from 1990 to 2008.
During the first years of the program, visa demand was lower than the numerical cap.
By the middle of the 1990s, the cap became binding and was temporarily increased to
115,000 for 1999 and 2000,14 and further raised to 195,000 for fiscal years 2001, 2002,
and 2003. H-1B demand plummeted in the aftermath of the 2001-recession. Because
of the decrease in demand, the cap was not reached in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. As
a consequence, in 2004 the cap returned to its current level of 65,000, though, in the
2006 fiscal year, an additional 20,000 additional visas were reserved for workers with
graduate degrees from US universities. Since returning to a lower level in 2004, the
cap has been binding every year.1516
My empirical strategy leverages these large policy-driven changes in H-1B employment for identification. Measuring these employment shocks to an industry is
challenging because government agencies do not keep track of the number of H-1B
workers that are in the US at any given point in time (GAO 2011).17 Since industry
stocks are unknown, my empirical approach measures shocks in first differences. I
estimate changes in industry stocks using microdata on all approved visas for initial
employment subject to the cap. These data are from the form I-129: “Petition for
a Nonimmigrant Worker.” A firm must file an I-129 application form with the US
14

This took place under the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement act of 1998
Under the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, government and
some nonprofit research organizations, as well as universities, became exempt from the cap so that
the number of visas issued exceeds the cap in many years. In my data, I cannot distinguish which
visas are cap-exempt. In Figure 1.1, I report an approximate number of cap-bound visas issued by
excluding firms in Healthcare and Education from the computation.
16
For FY 2006, however, an additional 20,000 additional visas were reserved for workers with graduate degrees from US universities.
17
There are national estimates of the H-1B population, however. Influential work by Kerr and
Lincoln (2010) uses an estimate of the population developed by Lowell (2000). Estimating the
population requires combining H-1B gross inflow data with assumptions about the rates at which
the stock is depleted.
15

8
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) to obtain an H-1B visa.18 Since these
records are not publicly available, I obtain them directly from the USCIS under a
Freedom of Information Act request. In addition to employer characteristics such as
name, location and four-digit NAICS industry, each I-129 record contains information
on worker occupation, age, country of origin, and annual wages. The data span the
fiscal years 1998–2012.19
Figure 1.2 describes the sector composition of H-1B workers subject to the cap.
To construct the figure, I use the I-129 data on over 2.5 million petitions approved
H-1B visas from 1998 to 2010.20 The figure underscores how H-1B employment is
highly concentrated in professional and business services (PBS). PBS industries obtain around 72 percent of all petitions. If we include financial services in this group,
business services account for close to 80 percent of all applications. The manufacturing sector as a whole takes only 13 percent of all petitions. About half of those
petitions are granted to firms in computer and communications manufacturing (e.g.
semiconductors, computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing, etc.). Figure 1.3
shows the percentage of H-1B petitions for the top 25 four-digit NAICS sectors. The
pattern outlined in the figure further details how the H-1B program is used primarily
by business services sectors. While Computers Systems Design (IT consulting) takes
the lions share of petitions (45%), the list includes 18 other business services sectors.

1.2.2

Labor Outcome Data and Input-Output Accounts

I obtain annual data on industry wages and employment from two sources: the
Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) program and the Occupational Employment
18

If the cap has not yet been exhausted, and admission requirements are met, the USCIS approves
the petitions. Petitions are approved on a first-come-first-served basis, so that visas are granted
irrespective of firm or worker characteristics such as industry or occupation.
19
For 1995–1997, the first three years in my analysis, I only know the total number of visas awarded
in each year. For each industry, I estimate the number of visas for these years by multiplying these
totals with the industrys share of total visas in 1998.
20
The figure does not include visas granted to Healthcare and Education because these sectors
became fully or partially exempt from the cap through the American Competitiveness in the TwentyFirst Century Act of 2000.
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Statistics (OES) program.21 The LPC includes total labor compensation, total employment and nominal and real output. I construct industry average wages by dividing labor compensation by total employment. For the most part, I restrict the
sample to industries for which data are available at the four-digit NAICS, to match
the level of aggregation in the H-1B data for a total of 137 industries. The data
span the period from 1987 to 2013 and cover most industries in manufacturing, retail
and wholesale, mining, and utilities. The LPC sample, however, does not include a
sizeable number of H-1B industries.22 For this reason, testing for the direct impact of
the program—the effect on the industries that directly hire H-1Bs—is not well-suited
using the LPC data. Thus, I only address direct effects when using the OES sample.
The OES series contains wages and employment for over 800 occupations and
covers most H-1B industries absent in the LPC.23 . Its primary disadvantage is that
the first year in the series is 1997. As explained below, this limits the set of robustness
exercises that can be performed using the OES data. For this reason, I first establish
the robustness of the baseline results on average wages and employment using the
LPC data. I then use the OES data first to estimate direct effects and then to test
for differential effects based on worker characteristics such as skill level.
Lastly, I characterize linkages between industries using data from the annual inputoutput (IO) tables, which are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).24

1.3

Methodology
This section outlines the approach I follow to estimate downstream effects, that

is, how labor demand in an industry responds to immigration shocks to its upstream
suppliers. In Section 3.1, I use a simple partial equilibrium model to motivate the em21

Both datasets are published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
The data excludes most PBS and finance industries.
23
See the appendix for a full description of industries covered in each dataset
24
Unfortunately, data for retail and wholesale –some of the largest purchasers of service inputs from
H-1B industries– are aggregated at the two-digit NAICS. To disaggregate input purchases for these
sectors, I use information from the 2007 Annual Surveys of Retail and Wholesale, which contains
detailed estimates of selected expenditures by four-digit NAICS subsectors on many high-skill service
inputs. Details of this procedure can be found on the Appendix.
22
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pirical specification and to provide guidance on how to measure downstream shocks.
Section 3.2 explains in detail how I measure these shocks. The last subsections show
the estimating equation and discuss threats to identification.

1.3.1

Framework

Consider an economy with I final good industries and a single industry (H-1B
industry) that produces intermediate goods (H-1B intermediates). All industries
are perfectly competitive. Each industry i = 1, ..., I combines labor (Li ) and H-1B
intermediates (Mi ) to produce a final output (qi ). In this simple setting, all final
good industries are downstream in the supply chain from the H-1B industry. The
production function for final good i is given by

σ−1
σ

qi = Ai (αLi Li

σ−1
σ
σ
) σ−1

i
+ αM
Mi

(1.1)

i
∈ (0, 1) are industry-specific distribution
where Ai is productivity and αLi , αM

parameters which allow for input intensity to vary across industries. The elasticity
of substitution σ > 0 is fixed across industries.
Each industry i faces a downward sloping output demand curve given by qiD (pi ) =
pi ηY exp(ai ), where ai > 0, and pi is the price of output. The elasticity of output
demand ηY < 0 is fixed across industries. Each industry faces an upward sloping
labor supply curve of the form LSi (wi ) = wi µ exp(bi ), where bi > 0, and wi is the wage.
The elasticity of labor supply µ > 0 is fixed across industries.
The H-1B industry uses only H-1B workers (LH ) in the production of M . Production takes place as

M = αH LH

(1.2)
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where αH > 0 is an efficiency constant. All industries face a common price for
M , pM . Sectors are small so that for a given pM they face an infinitely elastic
supply of M . The output demand curve for M is downward sloping and is given by:
P
M D (pM ) = i∈I MiD (pM ). H-1B workers supply labor inelastically and their stock is
a function of government policy. In particular, the government can increase the size
of the stock by allowing immigration to take place. Initially, admission levels are set
at 0. In equilibrium, factors are paid their marginal productivity, profits are zero and
markets clear.25
I am interested in how shocks to the stock of H-1B workers affect the labor outcomes of industries downstream. In the model, this happens when the government
lifts admission levels, where higher admissions imply larger shocks. Suppose that
the government raises admission levels. From (1.2), we see that this leads to an increase in intermediate output supply. Since the intermediate output demand curve is
downward-sloping, higher supply decreases the market clearing price pM . From the
standpoint a downstream industry, higher admissions act as a (exogenous) positive
shock to input prices and leads to higher usage of intermediates.
The effect on labor demand, however, is ambiguous. To see this, note that for a
given wage level, the cross-elasticity of labor demand with respect to pM is given by26
i
ηLM
= (|ηq | − σ) · siM

where siM =

p M Mi
pi qi

(1.3)

is the cost share of M in industry i. Equation (1.3) separates

the total effect from a price change into two opposing effects: substitution and scale.
The substitution effect occurs because a change in pM induces the industry to use
more M at the expense of L, as M has become relatively cheaper. A fall in pM ,
however, implies lower production costs which lead to an expansion in output, in25

Wages need not equalize across-industries because of imperfect labor mobility or other labor market
frictions.
26
Equation (1.3) is similar to Hammermesh [1993, p. 24]
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creasing demand for all inputs. Labor demand increases if the scale effect dominates
the substitution effect, that is, if |ηY | > σ.27
i
Even though the model is silent about the sign of ηLM
, it predicts, unambiguously,

a stronger effect for industries that are initially more exposed to the program. This is
i
because industries use H-1B intermediates with different intensities (siM ), and |ηLM
|

is large if siM is large.28 The intuition behind this prediction is simple. Technological
differences lead some industries to initially use relatively more of a certain input. An
immigration-related shock originates upstream and propagates down the supply-chain
in the form of a uniform reduction in the price faced by all downstream industries.
Those initially more exposed are more affected by the common price change. This
prediction guides how I construct downstream shocks.

1.3.2

Measuring Downstream Shocks

For simplicity, in the theory setting just described, I have assumed that immigration shocks originate in a single upstream industry. Because there are multiple H-1B
industries, to implement (1.3) empirically, I first map the various shocks originating
upstream into a single value. I measure the downstream skilled-immigration shocks
for each industry i in the following two steps. First, I define the direct shock to industry j as the change in production costs in j associated with higher H-1B employment.
This quantity is given by

∆Djt =

∆Hjt
Yjt−1

(1.4)

where ∆Hjt is the change in the H-1B wage bill between t and t − 1, and Yjt−1 is
the value of shipments in j at time t − 1. As mentioned in the data section, estimates
of H-1B employment and wages at the industry level are not available. To proxy for
27

Naturally, the effect on equilibrium wages and employment will depend on the slope of the labor
supply curve. Since is positive, however, if labor demand increases then wages and employment will
also increase, and vice versa.
28
To be precise, in this model, shares vary over industries on the basis of differences in the distribution
parameters (technology) but also because of equilibrium wages can vary across industries.
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change in the H-1B wage bill ∆Hjt , I use the wages of all H-1B workers in industry i
that received a cap-bound visa for initial employment and the employment contract
starts at time t, hjt . I measure this proxy using the I-129 microdata.29
Since the model tell us that direct shocks to industry j impact its downstream
customers differentially, the second step is to scale ∆Djt by the share of j in total
intermediate use in i, αijt . To get a single number for each industry-year, I sum over
all H-1B industries j that supply to i.3031 Specifically, the downstream shock to i at
time t, is given by

∆IDit =

X
j

αij0 × ∆Djt =

X
j

αij0 ×

hjt
Yjt−1

(1.5)

mij0
where αij0 = P
, and mij0 is the value of intermediates from j consumed
j mij0
by i in 1995. Using this methodology, we see that a downstream sector i will be
highly exposed to the H-1B program if it uses inputs intensively from sectors that are
directly exposed to the program. Data on the value of intermediates purchased (mij0 )
and output (Yjt−1 ) come from the annual IO use tables from the BLS, where mij0 , is
the use value. This approach to constructing downstream shocks is closely related to
Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price (2015); and Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr
(2015).
29

The Appendix documents features of these direct shocks. In general, sectors experiencing the
highest shocks will also be those with the highest raw H-1B counts, as described in Figure 1.3 (e.g.
IT consulting experiences the largest direct shocks).
30
In some cases, I weight the direct shocks by the share of total industry output instead of the
share of total intermediate usage. The results do not change significantly based on this choice of
normalization.
31
I restrict the set of H-1B industries j to those in high-skill service sectors since I cannot disaggregate
many input purchases for four-digit wholesale and retail industries. This is because the expenditure
data in the Annual Surveys of Retail and Wholesale do not include information for manufacturing
inputs. Though, as discussed above, most H-1Bs are employed in high-skill service sectors so that,
excluding wholesale and retail, the two measures are strongly positively correlated.

14
1.3.3

Specification

In this section, I outline the approach I follow to estimate the downstream effects
of the H-1B program – the effect on wages and employment in an industry caused by
immigration shocks to the industry’s suppliers. My specifications exploit differences
in downstream shocks across industries and over time.
I take to the data specifications of the form:

∆yit = δt + βDownstream ∆IDit + αCit + εit

(1.6)

where yit stands for the annual log change of the outcome of interest for industry i between 1995 and 2007. The error term is given by εit . Since we estimate
our βDownstream coefficient using a first-differenced specification, we have already controlled for time invariant differences across industries that may bias our estimates.
The variable δt controls for common shocks to industries in a given time interval.
Thus identification relies on within industry variation in outcomes over time while
accounting for shocks common to all industries in a given time period. The downstream shock variable ∆IDit is as described above but rescaled by its sample standard
deviation to aid with interpretation of the βDownstream coefficient. The variable Cit is
a vector of controls described in more detail below.
Identification of the βDownstream coefficient requires that downstream shocks are
not correlated with the error term in (1.6). The observed upstream shocks ∆Djt ,
however, may also be a function of latent demand shocks that cause wages and employment. For example, assume that changes in consumer preferences favor industries
intensive in intermediates from H-1B employer j. To meet higher output demand,
these industries hire more workers but also buy more intermediates from j. In turn,
to meet higher intermediate demand, industry j increases H-1B employment leading
to higher ∆Djt and thus to higher ∆IDit . In this scenario, unobserved shocks create
a positive link between the measured downstream shocks and the changes in labor
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demand that we observe. If we then relate ∆IDit with changes in labor outcomes
across industries as in (1.6), we may overstate the effect of downstream shocks.
To minimize these concerns, I develop two instruments that capture exogenous
variation in downstream shocks. To construct the variables, I first develop instruments for the direct shocks and follow a similar approach as in (1.5) to construct the
downstream instruments. The idea behind the first direct instrument is that because
of fixed differences in production technology some industries always obtain more visas
than others.32 Thus, these industries always receive a larger share of the annual cap
irrespective of the relative economic conditions they face.33 With this in mind, I
instrument the actual change in H-1B employment ∆Hjt with the change in H-1B
employment that would take place if we distributed the cap across industries based on
their historical exposure to foreign workers. Specifically, letting

Phi0
k hk0

stand for the

share of the wage bill received by i in a year in the pre-sample, the first instrument
hit
for ∆Dit =
is given by
Yit−1
∆DitIV1 =

Phi0 ×capt
k hk0
Yi0

=

P1
k hk0

× ∆Di0 × capt

(1.7)

where capt is the level of the cap at t, and ∆Di0 is the shock to j in the first year
of the sample. To improve the predictive power of the instrument, I measure

Phi0
k hk0

with data on all visas granted in the first two years in my data (i.e. I use visas issued
for initial employment in 1998 and 1999, as well as visas renewed in those years).
As shown in Figure 1.1, in most years in my sample, the cap binds or is very close
to the total number of visas issued. However, for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, two of
the three years the cap was at its highest point, the total number of visas granted
32

For example, some industries always use more STEM workers than others so that their quantity
demanded for H-1Bs is always higher: the IT consulting sector always requests more H-1B workers
than the Legal Services sector. Other industry characteristics may also generate these differences.
For example, some industries have stronger ties to foreign countries perhaps because firms in the
industry have affiliated partners in those countries. For firms in these industries it is less costly to
find and recruit foreign workers and thus hire relatively more of them.
33
Similarly, given an increase in the cap, we would expect the change in H-1B employment to be
even larger for these industries, and these changes to also be independent of the relative economic
conditions industries face.
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fell far below the cap. As a consequence, for these two years, the first instrument
is not a reasonable approximation of direct shocks. To increase predictive power in
periods when the cap does not bind, my instrumental variable strategy includes a
second variable given by

∆DitIV2 = ∆Di0 × πt

(1.8)

where πt is a dummy variable for the 2001–2002, and 2002–2003 periods.34
To construct the downstream shocks we follow a similar approach as before. The
downstream instruments are given by

∆IDitIV1 =

X

IV1
αij0 ∆Djt
=

X

j

αij0 × ∆Dj0 × capt = ∆IDi0 × capt

(1.9)

j

and
∆IDitIV2 =

X
j

IV2
αij0 ∆Djt
=

X

αij0 × ∆Dj0 × πt = ∆IDi0 × πt

(1.10)

j

where the weights αij0 are as previously defined but are now fixed at their value
in 1995. I measure the weights in the pre-sample to account for endogenous changes
in the input structure of industries which may bias my estimates.
Note that because the weights αij0 and the direct shocks ∆Dj0 are fixed in the
cross-section, we can write the instruments as the interaction between the aggregate
component of the instruments and the downstream shock in the first period ∆IDi0
(I refer to ∆IDi0 as industry i’s downstream dependency). To get an idea of the
industries that experience the largest downstream shocks in my sample, Table 1.1
reports the downstream dependencies ∆IDi0 for the top 40 industries.35 Note that
34

Below, I show that the results are robust to fitting the model without the 2001–2002, and 2002–
2003 intervals, and to estimating the model from 1995 to 2001.
35
In the Appendix, I report dependencies for the top 25 industries in both the OES and LPC
datasets. As mentioned above, the great majority of LPC industries are included in the OES and
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industries on the list are almost exclusively in the service sector. This is reasonable
given that most H-1B industries are service providers and service inputs constitute a
small share of total intermediate usage in the manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, on
this list, we find that a wide range of service sectors enter the top rankings. Naturally,
some of these sectors will also be highly exposed to the H-1B program directly in part
because industries tend to consume inputs from related industries intensively. Many
industries in PBS, information, and finance are both directly and indirectly exposed
to the H-1B program. Highlighted in Table 1.1, however, are industries that hire few
or no H-1B workers: about half of the industries on the list are not directly exposed
to the program including many four-digit industries in wholesale, retail, mining, and
other business services. The Appendix reports the least dependent industries. These
industries are almost exclusively in low-skill manufacturing although a handful of
retailers and the Forestry and Logging industry also make the list.
The patterns of dependency in Table 1.1 underscore why accounting for downstream effects is important in the context of the H-1B program. In particular, H-1B
employers are highly concentrated in a few industries and therefore only affect these
few industries directly. However, H-1B employers specialize in the production of
services consumed as inputs by other businesses. Since these services are used in
production in many different ways, H-1B employers have customers in virtually all
sectors of the economy.
In light of their role as input suppliers, if higher immigration increases the ability
of H-1B employers to sell inputs to their customers, the shocks may reach many
industries with little exposure to the original shocks. Since business services use
skilled labor intensively, this is a likely scenario given an increase in the H-1B quota.
That is, because production of IT services is strongly reliant on skilled labor, it is
likely that increasing the supply of foreign IT consultants leads to higher IT output,
lower prices, and affects labor outcomes in industries that use these services. Because
thus for the most part the lists differ to the extent that some industries are covered in the OES but
not in the LPC.
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many sectors of the economy consume IT services, shocks to IT-service providers
presumably affect many industries not directly exposed to the H-1B program.
Figure 1.4 shows the explanatory power of the cap-based instrument. The scatter
plot relates the explanatory variable ∆IDit with the instrumental variable in (1.7) and
represents the first-stage in the empirical model described above, without including
control variables, and excluding the years when the cap does not bind (i.e. excludes
the 2001–2002, and 2002–2003 periods). Each dot stands for one of 2460 industry-year
observations. I multiply the variables by one thousand to improve the readability of
the graphs. The slope of the regression line is .48 and is estimated precisely with a
robust t-statistic of 10.47. The corresponding r-squared is .68.

1.3.4

Alternative Hypotheses

I now discuss threats to identification. Recall that to estimate the causal effect of
downstream shocks on industry labor outcomes we must first address the fact that
intermediate input choice may be endogenous to shocks to labor demand. To deal
with this issue, I follow the instrumental variables approach previously described.
Nonetheless, identification still requires our instruments to be uncorrelated with said
shocks to labor demand. One concern is that the downstream dependency metric ∆IDi0 captures other industry differences that may independently generate the
patterns of wage and employment growth we observe. For instance, industries experiencing positive productivity or shocks to output demand, in the years prior to
the increase in the H-1B cap, may have simultaneously increased their intensity of
usage of H-1B inputs as well as their demand for labor. If these positive shocks are
persistent over time—that is, if these same set of industries continued to experience
these positive shocks (e.g. to output demand or productivity)—our tests will return
upwardly biased estimates of the effect of interest.
I address these issues in several ways. First, I include in the regressions variables
meant to capture an industry’s expected growth in outcomes given the growth tra-
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jectory observed before the increase in the cap. I include this measure to account
for trends in wages and employment that pre-date the change in H-1B policy but
may correlate with the instrument. I construct these measures as the mean annual
log change in wages and employment, from 1990 to 1995 (or to up to 1999, the year
of the first increase in the cap). By including these variables in the regressions, the
identification of the effect only uses deviations in outcome growth from the trend
observed before the change in H-1B admission policy. Similarly, in a more stringent
specification, I augment the estimating equation with industry-specific fixed effects.
This last exercise is equivalent to including industry-specific time trends because my
empirical models are expressed in first-differences.36 Finally, I include industry output
as a control to account for time-varying shocks to output demand which, if correlated
over time, may affect our estimates. On this same note, I exclude from the analysis
industries that may be particularly prone to persistent positive demand shocks during
the period (e.g. information, computers, and other ICT industries).
An additional possibility is that investment in IT capital assets, induced by rapidly
falling IT equipment and prepackaged software prices, explains the patterns of labor
outcome growth which are driving the results.37 For instance, given that IT prices are
falling throughout the sample period, it is possible that IT-intensive industries were
better equipped to take advantage of falling IT prices and thus benefitted disproportionately more than other industries. We must address this possible scenario since
the downstream dependency measure correlates with pre-sample IT capital intensity
due to strong H-1B employment by IT capital producers (IT consulting, computers,
software, telecoms, etc.). However, this correlation is unlikely to be one-to-one for
two reasons. First, the weighting scheme used to scale intermediate input consumption is specific to the H-1B program. IT capital services such as IT consulting receive
much larger weights than other IT capital sectors such as computer manufacturing
36

Industry-specific trends take care of the issue if the correlated shocks are relatively constant over
time.
37
Stiroh (2002) argues that most of the productivity acceleration in the 1990s occurred in ITproducer and IT-using industries.
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and semiconductors. Second, other business services sectors, which are not IT capital
producers, play a significant role in the program. For this reason, it is implausible
that IT capital accounts for the entire effect presented in the next section. Nevertheless, to further mitigate these concerns, the regressions in the next section control for
trends in IT capital usage.
A related concern is that supply side factors –that also put downward pressure
on the prices of business services– happened concurrently with the relaxation in admission levels. In the context of the model discussed above, technological change (a
shock to αH ) could have also increased output supply of business services. To fix
ideas, consider the following scenario: if IT consulting prices are mostly driven by the
same factors that drive the fall in IT hardware and software, our results may arise
from the steady decline in price of IT capital. The price of IT consulting services,
however, is mostly driven by the price of labor services provided by workers in computer occupations. Consistent with this statement, although during the 1990s the
price of IT hardware and software fell dramatically, the price of IT Consulting did
not (see Jorgenson 2001).

1.4

Results
In this section, I present estimates of the downstream effects of the H-1B program

on wages and employment. Before reporting the results, let us pause to discuss the
order in which I carry out my tests. As mentioned in the data section, the OES and
LPC datasets include industry average wages and total employment but differ in other
aspects. Specifically, the OES has data on occupations and larger industry coverage
but covers a shorter time span—the first year reported in the OES is 1997 versus 1987
in the LPC. Since we want to identify our effect using the policy changes beginning
in 1999, it is useful to have wage and employment data in the pre-treatment period
to use as a baseline from which to evaluate subsequent changes. Similarly, the longer
time span in the LPC data allows us to account better for pre-trends in wages and
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employment, which as mentioned above, may confound the estimates of downstream
effects. The downside of using the LPC data is that since LPC industries only cover
a small fraction of H-1B employment, estimates of the direct effects using these data
are not very informative.
Although the main contribution of this paper is the identification of downstream
effects—since the literature already addresses direct effects—it is useful to get a sense
of the size of the direct effects in order to compare their magnitude with the downstream effects. In light of this, and of the restrictions imposed by my data, I proceed
as follows. I first establish the robustness of the results on average wages and total employment using the LPC. I then estimate direct effects using the OES sample. Lastly,
using data on occupational wages and employment from the OES data, I extend
the analysis by considering how downstream effects vary with worker characteristics.
Specifically, I examine how the wages and employment of high-skill, low-skill, and
STEM workers employed in downstream industries respond to changes in the H-1B
program.

1.4.1

Average wages and total employment

I now present estimates of the coefficient of interest, βDownstream , which captures
the downstream effects of the H-1B program. First, I report estimates from the
baseline specification in Equation (1.6), which includes only period fixed effects as
controls. I then include the additional controls meant to alleviate omitted variable
concerns as discussed in Section 3.4. Table 1.2 reports results from estimating Equation (1.6) using 2SLS where the dependent variable is the yearly change in the log
of average wages. Different columns represent different specifications. The sample is
composed of 137 LPC industries for the period from 1995 to 2007. All specifications
include period fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the industry level. I first
discuss the results for wages and then for employment.
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Column 1 in Table 1.2 shows the baseline 2SLS results. The results indicate
a positive association between downstream shocks and average wage growth. The
coefficients are economically meaningful and estimated precisely. The results suggest
that a one standard deviation increase in industry downstream exposure leads to a
.44 percentage point increase in wage growth. Consistent with the graphical evidence
shown in Figure 1.4, the instruments are good predictors of downstream shocks with
first-stage F-statistics always in excess of 50. These estimates are consistent with the
hypothesis that increases in the H-1B population shift labor demand in downstream
industries leading to higher wages.
Columns 2-6 introduce the additional set of controls, namely, nominal output and
variables meant to capture pre-sample trends. In columns 2-6, I control for nominal
output. In columns 3 and 4, I account for pre-trends in wages and employment
where I construct the variables using data from 1990-1995 and 1990-1999, respectively.
Column 5 controls for trends in IT capital defined as the log ratio of 1997 IT capital
expenditures to total capital expenditures.38 Data on capital expenditures come from
the 1997 capital flow tables and are aggregated at the three-digit NAICS sector.39
Column 6 includes industry fixed effects to account for linear time trends that are
industry-specific.
As we include the various controls mentioned above, the estimated effect on wages
remains qualitatively the same. From this set of controls, the wage trends, and the
IT capital trends reduce the point estimates slightly to 0.32 - 0.42. The estimates for
the coefficients of the controls enter with the correct sign and are significant at the
1 percent level, except for the coefficient on IT capital, which is significant at the 10
percent level. Industry fixed effects increase the point estimates to 1.7. This estimate
is significant at the 10 percent level. The robustness of these results suggests that my
estimates are not the product of pre-trends in wages. In the context of this study,
38

This functional form follows Stiroh (2002).
I develop two other measures of IT capital intensity. The two proxies use IT capital expenditures
from the 2010 ICT survey from administered by the U.S. Census. I normalize IT capital expenditures
by either total capital expenditures or total employment in 2010 and then take logs.
39
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however, controlling for trends in wages and employment may underestimate the true
impact of the program because growth rates may respond to changes in the supply
of H-1B intermediate inputs.
The remaining columns in Table 1.2 show results from additional robustness exercises. Column 7 tests the sensitivity of the results to industry sample choice and
column 8 to how we measure downstream shocks. Column 7 shows the point estimate
from regressions omitting the five most dependent sectors. Though the estimated coefficient of .39 is a bit smaller than the baseline reported in the first column, it is
the correct sign and is still highly significant. The stability of the estimates reported
argues against the results being driven by outlier industries. In column 8, I now construct downstream shocks by weighing the direct shocks of supplying industries by
the ratio of intermediate use to gross output instead of by the ratio of intermediate
use to total intermediate use. In this case, the point estimate decreases slightly, and
precision is largely unaffected. Column 9 shows an OLS estimate of similar magnitude
to the 2SLS estimate, although a bit smaller, and with a larger standard error. In
columns 10 and 11 we test the robustness of the results to excluding the time periods
when the cap does not bind. For these two cases, the estimation takes place using
a single instrument– the cap-based instrument. Column 10 excludes the 2001-2002
and the 2002-2003 periods from the estimation. Column 11 shows estimates using
the period from 1995 to 2001. In both cases, the estimates are of similar magnitude
as before and still highly significant.
It is worth mentioning that although I am not able to observe immigration status
in my data, my estimates imply that the H-1B program indirectly benefits native US
workers. First, there is little reason to believe that downstream shocks affect native
and foreign workers differently. Second, my main results come from the LPC sample,
which as previously mentioned does not include the industries that employ most
high-skilled foreigners. Also, as is well-known, and documented in Cortes (2008), lowskilled foreign workers are heavily concentrated in sectors in low-skill manufacturing,
agriculture, personal services, and construction. These sectors are some of the least
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exposed to downstream shocks. Thus, a significant portion of the gains implied by
my estimates accrue to workers in sectors with little immigrant presence (e.g. retail
and wholesale).
In column 12, we now explore the results using the larger OES sample. Recall that
using this sample I can estimate direct effects. The sample now includes 48 additional
industries including the largest H-1B employers for a total of 185 industries for the
period 1997 to 2007. For example, we now have data on the IT consulting industry,
and the R&D services industry. Using this larger sample, I find a wage estimate
close in magnitude to those estimated using the LPC (the coefficient is .29 versus .44
in the baseline specification). The standard errors are larger, but the coefficient is
still significant at the 5 percent level. The bottom row in column 12 shows the wage
estimates for the direct shock of the program. As with the downstream shock variable,
I normalize the direct shock variable by its sample standard deviation—which eases
comparability of the magnitude of the direct effect with that of the indirect effect. I
find a positive direct effect on average wages. However, the direct effect coefficient
is smaller than the indirect effect coefficient. A one standard deviation increase in
direct exposure is associated with a .18 percentage point increase in wage growth.
Table 1.3 shows results from estimating Equation (1.6) using 2SLS where the
dependent variable is now the yearly change in the log of total employment. The
estimates displayed in the table show a weak association between downstream shocks
and employment growth. In columns 1-5, which include the set of controls, the
estimate of the downstream shock is slightly negative but not significantly different
from 0. The coefficients on output and wage growth are positive and highly significant,
as expected. Once we include the industry fixed effects in column 6, the point estimate
becomes more negative, but it is still not significantly different from 0. In Column
7, which omits the top 5 most dependent sectors in the LPC data, we see a change
in the sign of the estimates, which are now positive and significant at the 1 percent
level. In the last column, which uses the larger OES sample, I still find no evidence
of downstream employment effects.

25
In contrast to the downstream effects, the direct effect on employment is positive
and significant (t-ratio of 2.32). To find that direct shocks increase total employment
is natural because total employment rises mechanically as industries employ more
H-1B workers. For this reason, estimating the direct effects on employment in this
study is problematic. In particular, because I do not observe immigration status, I
cannot discern the effect on total employment for native workers.
To summarize, in this section I document a positive association between downstream shocks and wage growth. The results are robust to controlling for industry
output and other potentially confounding trends. I find no consistent downstream
effects on total employment with most specifications finding no effect. I find some
evidence that direct shocks have a positive impact on employment and average wages.

1.4.2

High-Skill, Low-Skill and STEM wages and employment

In this section, I explore whether wages and employment outcomes respond to
the H-1B program based on worker characteristics such as skill level and occupation
(STEM versus non-STEM). In addition to showing how downstream effects vary with
worker traits, this exercise is useful for another reason. The estimated positive downstream effects of the H-1B program on wages suggests that U.S. workers benefit from
expansions in the H-1B program. This conclusion may be misleading if the program
harms some groups of workers, but the effects are obscured within averages. For
example, if H-1B inputs are substitutable with low-skilled tasks but complementary
with high-skilled tasks, industries may substitute towards high-skilled labor, leading
to higher average wages but obscuring the negative impact on low-skilled workers.
This section contains a deeper analysis of this possible scenario. The occupational
data on wages and employment I use in this section come from the OES. Because the
OES contains data on industries that directly hire H-1B workers, I will also report
estimates of the direct effect.
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To approximate the wages and employment of high-skilled and low-skilled workers,
I first categorize each 6-digit SOC occupation based on their skill level. I develop two
proxies for occupational skill level as in Crino (2010), which label each occupation
based on the average level of education of the workers employed in that occupation.
The first proxy (Skill Proxy 1) defines high-skilled occupations as those with the
average schooling level of a bachelor’s degree or better.40 The second proxy (Skill
Proxy 2) defines high-skilled occupations as those with a share of college graduates in
excess of 60 percent. I use STEM definitions from the BLS to classifify occupations
as STEM or non-STEM. I aggregate occupational wages and employment based on
these proxies.
Motivating the empirical tests in this section is the same conceptual framework
as that outlined in the theory section. That is, downstream shocks affect a subset
of workers based on the degree of complementarity between that labor type and H1B-related inputs. Moreover, the effect will vary across industries because industries
differ in how intensively they use these inputs. Letting x denote high-skill, low-skill,
or STEM workers, I run for each group separately, specifications of the form

∆yitx = δt + βx,Downstream ∆IDit + +βx,Direct ∆Dit + εxit

(1.11)

where yitx is either the percentage change in wages for group x or the change
in employment normalized by initial industry employment. We are now interested
in the coefficients βx,Downstream and βx,Direct which capture the downstream effects
and the direct effects, respectively. All specifications include period fixed effects
δt and cluster standard errors at the industry level. The error term is given by
εxit . In the next section, I augment the specification in (1.11) with a set of control
variables. I instrument for ∆IDit as in the previous section, and for the direct shocks
∆Hit
∆Dit =
, with the two direct instruments ∆DitIV1 = ∆Di0 ×capt , and ∆IDitIV2 =
Yit−1
∆IDi0 × πt , as defined in (1.7) and (1.8).
40

I do this using the 2004 5% extract from the Public Use Microdata Series (PUMS, Ruggles et. al,
2008). A more detailed description is given in the appendix
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Table 1.4 reports the 2SLS estimates of Equation (1.11). Column captions denote
the dependent variable yitx . Panels A and B of Table 1.5 show the results for the first
and second skill proxies, respectively. In each panel, the first row reports the downstream coefficient and the second row the coefficient for the direct effect. Columns
1-3 present the estimates for the log change in the wages of high-skilled, low-skilled
and STEM workers, respectively. Columns 4-6 show estimates for the corresponding
employment variables. Since the results are qualitatively the same in Panels A and
B, I simply discuss the findings in Panel A.
Columns 1-3 of Table 1.4 show that downstream shocks increase the wages of
high-skilled, low-skilled, and STEM workers. The coefficients are estimated precisely,
and their magnitude is economically meaningful. A one standard deviation increase
in industry downstream exposure leads to a .42 percentage point increase in the highskilled wage. A similar increase in downstream exposure leads to a .27 percentage
point increase in the low-skilled wage. These results suggest that, overall, inputs from
H-1B industries are complementary with labor inputs. As well, the estimated wage
gains imply that the results found in the previous section for average wages are not
simply a consequence of changes in the employment mix within industries. In the
second row of Panel A, we find little support for direct effects on wages with none of
the estimates being significantly different from 0.
In columns 4 through 6 I find evidence that downstream gains in employment
accrue to high-skill and STEM workers but not to low-skill workers. The coefficients
on the high-skill and STEM employment variables are significant at the 1 percent level.
A one standard deviation increase in downstream shocks to an industry is associated
with an increase in the growth of high-skill employment by .08 percentage points of
total employment. Taken together, the effect on average wages found in the previous
section seems to arise from a combination of an increase in worker compensation and
an increase in the employment of high-skill and STEM workers.
Moving to the second row of the panel, we find a positive direct effect on the
employment of high-skill and STEM workers. For both high-skill and STEM em-
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ployment, the direct effect is larger in magnitude than the indirect effect. A one
standard deviation increase in direct shocks to an industry leads to an increase in the
growth of high-skill and STEM employment by .15 and .23 percentage points of total
employment, respectively. In both cases, the standard errors are extremely small
with t-ratios larger than 8. Finding a strong response from skilled employment is not
surprising given the mechanical correlation previously discussed. As before, I cannot
determine the effect on natives because total STEM employment mechanically rises
as H-1B employment rises.41
I now address the threats to identification previously discussed by performing a
similar set of robustness checks as in the analysis undertaken using the LPC data.
That is, I include the set of controls previously discussed, namely, expected measures
of wages and employment growth, industry output, and IT capital intensity. Recall
that controlling for pre-trends in wages and employment is problematic in the OES
data because the first year in the sample is 1997. To incorporate these trends into
the analysis in this section, I merge the LPC controls to the OES dataset. Because
the most LPC industries are also sampled in the OES, the analysis that follows uses
a smaller set of 124 LPC industries. As before, I do not report the direct effects since
they are not very informative in the smaller LPC sample.
Table 1.5 reports the results using the smaller set of industries. As a point of
reference, row A in Table 1.5 shows the baseline results from Table 1.4 row A, which
use the main definition of skill, and include only period fixed effects as controls. In
Row B, we introduce the additional controls using the LPC industries. The elasticities
for all coefficients are in similar in terms of magnitude and significance as in the
OES sample. For example, the coefficient for high-skill wages is .52 in the LPC
sample and .42 in the OES sample, and is still highly significant with a t-ratio of
4.04. These estimates mitigate concerns that the results are contingent on sample
selection. The coefficients for high-skill and STEM employment are still significant
41

This would not be the case, however, if H-1B works fully displaced native workers. In this case,
total employment would not change. There is little evidence that skilled workers displace native in
the literature, however.
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at the 1 percent level, but the coefficients fall from .08-.09 to .05. Row C shows
that the results are nearly identical once we use the second skill proxy. Row D
excludes STEM occupations when constructing the high-skill and low-skill wage and
employment variables. In this case, the coefficient on high-skill employment is driven
to zero suggesting that employment effects for high-skill workers are being driven by
the effects on STEM occupations. The final row excludes the top 5 most dependent
sectors. Overall, the point estimates are not substantially reduced compared to the
baseline shown in Row A. However, the coefficient on STEM employment is now
estimated quite imprecisely.

1.5

Conclusion
To my knowledge, this is the first study examining the relationship between skilled

immigration and US labor market outcomes taking national industries as the unit
of analysis. By focusing on industries, I can examine an indirect effect previously
unexplored in the literature: the downstream effect of skilled immigrants. That is,
how labor demand in an industry responds to immigration shocks to its upstream
suppliers. Motivating this approach is the industrial composition of H-1B workers.
In particular, H-1B employer industries are high-skilled labor intensive and supply
intermediate service inputs to virtually all sectors of the US economy. Because these
industries use skilled labor intensively, shocks to the supply of skilled labor likely
translate into meaningful increases in output supply to the benefit of their many
downstream customers.
Consistent with this idea, I find strong downstream effects on average wages, and
these effects are larger than the corresponding direct effects. Although immigration
status is not discernible in my data, the estimated downstream wage effects suggest
that US natives benefit from higher admission rates because dependent downstream
sectors tend to employ few immigrants. In an extension, I find evidence that downstream shocks affect average wages partly through an increase in worker compensation
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and partly through an increase in the employment of high-skilled and STEM workers. Lastly, I find evidence that average wages increase in directly exposed industries
mostly through an increase in the employment of STEM and high-skilled workers.
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Fig. 1.1.. The H-1B numerical cap and number of approved visas subject to the cap,
1990-2008.
Notes: Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of the H-1B numerical cap and the actual number of
visas issued subject to the cap for 1990-2008. The figure excludes visas issued to Healthcare
and Education because these sectors became fully or partially exempt from the cap through
the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000. Data on aggregate
visa issuances from 1990 to 1997 are taken from Kerr and Lincoln (2010). Data on aggregate
visa issuances from 1998 to 2008 are computed using data from the Form I-129
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Fig. 1.2.. H-1B Applications by Major Sector, 1998-2010
Notes: Figure 1.2 reports the major sector (two-digit NAICS) distribution of over 2.5 million
approved H-1B applications for 1998-2010. The data used includes new approved H-1Bs as
well as those for continuing employment. The figure excludes Healthcare and Education,
which became fully or partially exempt from the cap through the American Competitiveness
in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000. PBS stands for Professional and Business Services.
Source: Form I-129 from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
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Fig. 1.3.. H-1B Applications by Detailed Sector, 1998-2010
Notes: Figure 1.3 reports the percentage of total H-1B petitions for the top 25 minor sectors
(4-digit NAICS) for over 2.5 million approved H-1B applications for 1998-2010. The data
used includes new approved H-1Bs as well as those for continuing employment. The figure
excludes Healthcare and Education which became fully or partially exempt from the cap
through the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000. The
vertical gray bar denotes a break in the x-axis created to save space. Each bar representing
a minor sector is colored according to the major sector to which it belongs.
Source: Form I-129 from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
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Fig. 1.4.. Downstream shock and Instrumental Variable
Notes: The scatter plot shows the relationship between the measure of industry downstream
shocks and the instrumental variable. Each point in the scatterplot represents an industryyear pair for 185 industries for 1995-2007, excluding the years when the cap does not bind
(i.e. 2002 and 2003). The downstream shock is scaled by 100 to improve readability. The
t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors.
Source: Form I-129 from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
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Notes: Table 1.1 presents the 40 most indirectly dependent industries in the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) sample. H-1B indirect dependency is constructed
using data on H-1B visas issued in 1998 and data from the 1997 Benchmark IO tables. The measure is scaled by 1000 to improve readability. Sectors are highlighted if
they are not directly dependent on the H-1B program

Industry

#

Table 1.1.. Most Indirectly Dependent Industries

40

1780
137
501.3

Number of observations
Number of industries
F-Statistic

1780
137
507.0

No
No

0.17***
(8.12)

0.44***
(4.13)

(2)

1780
137
557.2

No
No

0.18***
(2.97)

0.17***
(7.81)

0.42***
(3.84)

(3)

1780
137
477.5

No
No

0.35***
(3.56)

0.17***
(7.69)

0.32***
(3.44)

1637
126
473.8

Yes
No

0.17*
(1.79)

0.18***
(7.83)

0.44***
(4.21)

(5)

1780
137
74.1

No
Yes

0.17***
(6.56)

1.70**
(2.48)

(6)

1715
132
926.1

No
No

0.39***
(2.82)

(7)

1780
137
65.5

No
No

0.39***
(5.09)

(8)

Dependent variable: ∆ Log Wage Bill per Worker
(4)

1780
137
X

No
No

0.30***
(3.13)

(9)

1506
137
66.9

No
No

0.54***
(4.26)

(10)

958
137
99.7

No
No

0.65***
(3.43)

(11)

1840
185
67.7

No
No

0.18**
(2.13)

0.29**
(2.14)

(12)

Notes: Each column in Table 1.2 presents the results from industry-year regressions using the change in the log wage bill per worker as the dependent variable from Labor
Productivity and Cost (LPC) data over 1995 to 2007. To construct the downstream shock variable, I first interact the direct shocks to the industrys suppliers with their
share in total intermediate input costs, and then sum across all suppliers. Direct shocks are defined as the change in the H-1B wage bill normalized by industry output.
The first instrumental variable for downstream shocks interacts the indirect dependency measure with the cap. The second instrument interacts indirect dependency with
a dummy that equals 1 for the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 intervals. Indirect dependencies are constructed using data on H-1B visas issued in 1998-1999 and data from the
1997 Benchmark IO tables. All specifications are unweighted and include period and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.

No
No

0.44***
(4.38)

Other controls
Industry Fixed Effects

H-1B Direct Shock

IT Capital Control

Wage Growth (1990-1999)

Wage Growth (1990-1995)

∆ Log Output

H-1B Downstream Shock

(1)

Table 1.2.. Industry-Level Wage Regressions, LPC Sample
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1780
137
501.3

Number of observations
Number of industries
F-Statistic

1780
137
507.0

No
No

0.21***
(6.37)

-0.07
(-0.36)

(2)

1780
137
557.2

No
No

0.39***
(5.58)

0.20***
(6.19)

-0.00
(-0.01)

(3)

1780
137
477.5

No
No

0.57***
(6.98)

0.19***
(6.12)

-0.07
(-0.46)

1637
126
473.8

Yes
No

-0.38*
(-2.30)

0.20***
(6.24)

-0.07
(-0.40)

(5)

1780
137
74.1

No
Yes

0.14***
(4.59)

-1.51
(-1.12)

(6)

1715
132
926.1

No
No

0.64***
(3.80)

(7)

Dependent variable: ∆ Log Employment
(4)

1780
137
65.5

No
No

-0.32*
(-1.76)

(8)

1780
137
X

No
No

0.24
(0.98)

(9)

1506
137
66.9

No
No

-0.03
(-0.13)

(10)

958
137
99.7

No
No

-0.28
(-0.74)

(11)

1840
185
67.7

No
No

0.25**
(2.32)

0.52
(1.43)

(12)

Notes: Each column in Table 1.3 presents the results from industry-year regressions using the change in log employment as the dependent variable from Labor Productivity
and Cost (LPC) data over 1995 to 2007. To construct the downstream shock variable, I first interact the direct shocks to the industrys suppliers with their share in
total intermediate input costs, and then sum across all suppliers. Direct shocks are defined as the change in the H-1B wage bill normalized by industry output. The first
instrumental variable for downstream shocks interacts the indirect dependency measure with the cap. The second instrument interacts indirect dependency with a dummy
that equals 1 for the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 intervals. Indirect dependencies are constructed using data on H-1B visas issued in 1998-1999 and data from the 1997
Benchmark IO tables. All specifications are unweighted and include period and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.

No
No

-0.08
(-0.31)

Other controls
Industry Fixed Effects

H-1B Direct Shock

IT Capital Control

Employment Growth (1990-1999)

Employment Growth (1990-1995)

∆ Log Output

H-1B Downstream Shock

(1)

Table 1.3.. Industry-Level Employment Regressions, LPC Sample
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-0.05*
(-1.81)

0.32***
(3.37)
-0.03
(-1.37)

Direct Shock

H-1B Downstream Shock

Direct Shock

0.10***
(2.85)

0.28***
(2.87)

0.07**
(1.98)

0.27***
(2.64)

Low-Skill
(2)

0.08
(1.41)

0.27**
(2.17)

0.08
(1.41)

0.27**
(2.17)

STEM
(3)

0.15***
(9.29)

0.06***
(2.62)

Panel B: Skill Proxy 2

0.15***
(8.09)

0.08***
(3.69)

Panel A: Skill Proxy 1

High-Skill
(1)

0.05
(1.17)

0.16
(1.07)

0.04
(1.03)

0.14
(0.96)

Low-Skill
(2)

Employment

0.23***
(16.82)

0.07***
(2.90)

0.23***
(16.82)

0.07***
(2.90)

STEM
(3)

Notes: Each column in Table 1.5 presents the results from industry-year regressions using as the dependent variable the wages and employment of high-skill, low-skill and
STEM workers as described on the column heading. Wage and employment data for 189 industries are from the Occupational Employment Survey (OES) over 1997 to
2007 for a total of 2013 observations. Rows A and C-E use the first skill definition obtained by averaging an occupations level of education with data from the 2000 Census.
Row B uses the alternative definition. STEM classification of occupations comes from the BLS. Row C excludes STEM workers in the construction of high and low skill
variables. Row D omits Information and Communications Technology sectors. The explanatory variable in rows A-D is the interaction of the log of the national H-1B
population and the indirect dependency measure which is constructed using data from the 1997 Benchmark IO tables and data on H-1B visas issued in 1998. In row E,
the explanatory variable is the interaction of the log of the national H-1B population with a dummy variable that collects industries into quintiles of indirect dependency.
All specifications are unweighted, include year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.

0.42***
(3.55)

H-1B Downstream Shock

High-Skill
(1)

Wages

Table 1.4.. Indirect Impact of the H-1B program on the Wages and Employment of High-Skill, Low-Skill and STEM Workers
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0.44***
(4.12)
0.53***
(5.04)
0.62***
(3.37)

(C) Skill Proxy 2

(D) Excluding STEM

(E) Excluding 5 Most
Dependent Sectors

0.37***
(2.91)

0.30***
(3.40)

0.31***
(3.44)

0.32***
(3.37)

Wages
Low-Skill
(2)
0.27***
(2.64)

0.39**
(2.32)

0.22
(1.56)

0.22
(1.56)

0.22
(1.56)

STEM
(3)
0.27**
(2.17)

0.07**
(2.23)

-0.00
(-1.04)

0.04**
(2.51)

0.05***
(2.85)

High-Skill
(1)
0.08***
(3.69)

0.19*
(1.65)

0.02
(0.18)

0.03
(0.27)

0.02
(0.22)

Employment
Low-Skill
(2)
0.14
(0.96)

0.05
(1.47)

0.05**
(2.30)

0.05**
(2.30)

0.05**
(2.30)

STEM
(3)
0.07***
(2.90)

119

124

124

124

185

N

Notes: See Table 1.4. Each column in Table 1.5 presents the results using OES data but restricting the sample to the 143 industries in the LPC. Row A shows the results
without the inclusion of controls. Rows B-E include controls for output and for expected wage and employment pre-trends.

0.52***
(4.04)

(B) Skill Proxy 1

(A) Skill Proxy 1:
OES Sample

High-Skill
(1)
0.42***
(3.55)

Table 1.5.. Robustness Checks: OES data using LPC Industry Sample
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2. SKILLED IMMIGRANTS AND THE EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITIES OF YOUNG SKILLED NATIVES IN
US CITIES
2.1

Introduction
A large portion of the number of skilled guest workers joining the US labor market

each year does so with an H-1B visa. A continuing debate exists over whether H1B workers hurt or improve the employment prospects of US workers. Noting that
most H-1Bs work in STEM occupations – a critical input to technology creation and
dissemination – some argue the cap on admissions prevents firms from hiring the
workers they need to innovate (Gates 2008). Others argue the cap is already too
high, and there is no shortage of qualified natives willing to fill the positions taken by
foreign workers (Matloff 2003, Lowell 2014). The program simply acts as a subsidy
to companies at the expense of US workers.
In this study, I examine how high-skilled immigrants relate to the employment of
US college-educated workers in US states. A novel feature of this study is a focus on
how skilled immigrants affect the employment prospects of young natives within this
demographic group1 . I focus on young college-educated workers because their skills
and work experience most closely resembles that of skilled immigrants and thus they
are the most likely group to compete with skilled immigrants for jobs. Previous work
that exploits differences in outcomes across local labor markets to identify the employment effects of high-skill immigration finds little evidence of displacement (Kerr
and Lincoln 2010, Peri et al. 2014, 2015). These studies, however, do not consider
how the effect may vary with age, which seems important in our context given that
1

In a firm-level study, Pekkala Kerr, Kerr, and, Lincoln 2014, find some evidence that young-skilled
immigrants increase the employment of young natives.
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85 percent of H-1Bs are 35 or younger. My tests employ administrative data on all
approved H-1B visas during 2000-2009 fiscal years. I obtain the data under a Freedom of Information Act Request from the US Citizenship and Immigration Service
(USCIS).
Identifying the employment effects of skilled immigrants on US workers is challenging
because variation in inflows across states may be caused by differences in their current
economic environment. A shock to productivity in a state, for example, may increase
demand for all labor inputs and thus immigrant inflows may be endogenous to the
employment of domestic workers. To deal with this issue, I instrument inflows with
two variables that take advantage of the fact that it was much more difficult to obtain
visas in the 2005-2009 period than from 2000 to 2004.
The first instrument builds on the empirical methodology of Kerr and Lincoln
(2010) who study the effect of H-1B workers on the rate of patenting and employment.
The idea is to leverage large changes in the national availability of visas induced by
changes in immigration policy. For the 2004 fiscal year, the cap was lowered from to
195,000 visas per year to 65,000, where it has remained since. The lowering of the
cap had a stronger impact in states based on their initial exposure to the program.
This differential decline in visas across states is arguably unrelated to changes in their
relative economic opportunities.
Even though the first instrument is a good predictor of H-1B inflows, we can
leverage an additional source of aggregate variation to improve its explanatory power.
Unique to this paper, is a second instrumental variable that uses changes in the
availability of visas caused by changes in the demand by the largest industry recipient
of visas. The motivation is as follows. In any given year, the share of all H-1B visas
granted to the largest employer – IT and Management Consultants (NAICS 5415-6)—
is substantial. The share fluctuates greatly during the 2000-2009 period. Since the US
government allocates visas on a first-come-first-served basis, and visas are in limited
supply, firms compete for available visas. In essence, an increase in the demand of
IT Consultants drastically and arguably exogenously (to any given state) reduces the

47
aggregate number of visas granted to other sectors. Given this, we can construct an
instrument for the inflows into a state, for all H-1Bs not employed by IT Consultants.
Consequently, when using this strategy we look for evidence of displacement of the
native population not employed by IT Consultants. Both instruments can explain
a significant portion of the within-state change in H-1B visas granted. The second
instrument, for example, can explain over 80 percent of the within-state change in
visas in the 2000-2009 period.
My analysis employs microdata on workers in 50 states drawn from the 2000
Census and the 2001-2009 American Community Survey. Consistent with previous
findings, there is little evidence that H-1B workers lower total college-educated employment. Though the estimates are always slightly negative, they are almost always
imprecisely estimated. The effects for young natives, however, are always negative
and significant. My estimates suggest that increasing the growth rate of H-1B workers by one percentage point of total employment decreases the growth rate of young
college-educated native employment by 2-4 percentage points of total employment.
These results are consistent with a scenario in which young skilled workers are more
substitutable with H-1B workers than older natives. To my knowledge, this is the first
empirical paper that finds a negative effect of skilled foreigners on the employment of
skilled young natives. It is also one of the very few that finds negative employment
effects on any group of workers2 .
This article contributes to a larger literature on the effects of skilled immigrants
on other variables such as patents and productivity (Kerr and Lincoln 2010, Hunt
and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010, and Moser, Voena and Waldinger 2012, Borjas and Doran 2012)3 . More broadly, this paper fits in the literature the impacts of general
immigration on the host country4 . My identification strategy, for example, is related
2

A notable exception is a firm-level study by Doran, Isen, and Gelber 2014 that finds that hiring
an H-1B worker increase employment at the firm by less than 1 worker, which is taken as evidence
of displacement. Borjas (2009) finds that foreign doctoral students lower the wages of native-born
doctorates.
3
See surveys by Nathan(2013), Kerr (2013) and Chapter 8 in Borjas(2014)
4
With respect to the impact of immigration on the labor market, the seminal contributions are Card
(2001) and Borjas(2003). See also surveys by Hanson (2009) and Chapters 3-6 in Borjas(2014).
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to the approach in Kato and Sparber (2013) who study how the decrease in the cap
in 2004 impacted the quality of international student applicants to US universities.
This study is also related to Smith (2012) who finds that low-skill immigrants hurt
the employment prospects of teens in the US, an effect missed in city-level studies
that estimate the same effect for all age groups.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background on the H-1B
program and summarizes the data sources used. Section III discusses the empirical
strategy, the identification problem, and the instrumental variable approach. Section
IV presents the results and various robustness exercises. Section V concludes.

2.2

H-1B Visa Background and Data

2.2.1

Background

A novel feature of this study is its usage of MSA-specific data on approved H-1B
visas. I first provide a brief description of the H-1B program to describe the data
better. This summary also highlights aspects of the program relevant in the empirics.
The H-1B visa grants temporary working rights to high-skill foreign workers, with
most H-1B recipients having at least a bachelor’s degree.5 The H-1B program came
into effect under the Immigration Act of 1990. Congress set a quota (commonly
referred to as the “cap”) of 65,000 on the number of visas to be issued each year. By
the middle of the decade, the cap became binding and was increased to over 100,000
workers for fiscal years 1999 and 2000.6 The cap was further raised to 195,000 for
fiscal years 2001, 2002 and 2003 but because of falling H-1B demand that followed
the 2001-recession, it was lowered in 2004 to its current level of 65,000.78 Since 2004,
the cap has been exhausted every year. These large policy-driven changes in the
5

In general, more than half of successful applicants are in Science and Engineering or computer
related professions (Kerr and Lincoln, 2010).
6
This took place under the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement act of 1998
7
For the most part, growth in the H-1B population mirrors changes in the level of the cap with
differences arising in years where the cap does not bind.
8
Under the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, government and
some nonprofit research organizations, as well as universities, were exempt so that the number of
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availability of visas will be at the core of the identification strategy I use in this
paper.
The application process requires a potential recipient to be sponsored by her
prospective employer and thus the firm finds the worker in advance9 . First, the
employer must file a Labor Condition Application (LCA) with the Department of
Labor to ensure that the employment arrangement will comply with US labor laws.
The firm specifies the location, salary, length, and type of employment. With the LCA
in hand, the employer files a form I-129, “Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker”, with
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). If the applicant meets the
admission criteria and the cap is not yet reached, the USCIS approves the petition
(GAO 2011).10 Petitions are approved on a first-come-first-served basis, irrespective of
firm or worker characteristics such as location, industry, or occupation. The window
to submit petitions to the USCIS for a given fiscal year opens on April 1st of the
previous fiscal year, six months before the employment arrangement is set to begin.
If the cap is close to being reached, the USCIS stops receiving applications and runs
a lottery to allocate the remaining visas.
The USCIS issues visas for three-year at a time after which the employer can apply
for a three-year extension. As well, the worker can switch employers at any point in
time. Extensions and changes of employer require the filing of a new LCA and Form
I-129 though they do not count towards the cap. The H-1B is a “dual intent” visa:
the recipient can legally pursue immigrant status while holding a temporary visa. At
any point during the worker’s employment arrangement, the firm can choose to file
for permanent residency for the worker in which case the worker can stay in the US
indefinitely.
new visas issues always exceeds the cap. As well, in FY 2005, 20,000 additional visas were reserved
for workers with graduate degrees.
9
This can be done in a multitude of ways. For instance, firms can recruit foreigners already in the
US as students or from abroad through foreign affiliates and other sources.
10
If the worker is already in the U.S., the USCIS changes their previous visa status to H-1B and
the worker may begin working immediately. Otherwise, the worker takes the approved I-129 to a
consular office of the Department of State which reviews the entire package and issues the visa.
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2.2.2

H-1B Data and Summaries

The empirical analysis will require data on H-1B inflows at the state-level. Unfortunately, government agencies do not keep track of the number of H-1B workers that
are in the U.S. at a given point in time (GAO 2011).11 Instead, I approximate inflows
to a state in a given period from microdata on all newly approved visas, taken from
the form I-129. I obtained the data from the USCIS under a Freedom of Information
Act request. Aside from employer characteristics such as name, address and 4-digit
NAICS industry, each I-129 record contains data on worker occupation, annual wages,
age and country of origin. The data span the fiscal years 1998 to 2011.
To help us classify workers into useful age categories let us consider the age distribution of H-1B workers. Table 2.1 reports the age profile of workers who obtained
a visa for the first time in the year 2000, the initial year of the sample period. The
largest group –with almost 40 percent of the total– is that of workers in the 26-30
range. The second largest age group consists of workers in the 21-25 range (27.6%)
so that about two-thirds of H-1B visas are granted to workers under 30 years of age.
Only around 7 percent of H-1Bs are over the age of 40. Motivated by these summaries,
I define young workers as being 30 years old or younger.

2.3

Methodology

2.3.1

Specification

We want to estimate how hiring skilled immigrants affect the employment opportunities of US natives. To this purpose, I exploit differences in H-1B hiring across
states and over time. I take to the data the following specifications:
11

Estimating the population requires combining H-1B gross inflow data with assumptions about the
rates at which the stock is depleted.

51

∆y it = γi + δrt + β∆Hit + αC it + εit

(2.1)

where ∆yit stands for the annual employment change for the demographic group of
interest for state i. As mentioned above, we are interested in testing for displacement
effects and thus we want to focus on native groups with similar characteristics to
H-1B workers as we would expect these groups to experience stronger competition
from H-1Bs. To this purpose, I focus on natives with a college degree or better. Given
that H-1Bs are young, I also explore the impact for natives with 30 years of age or
less.
The change in the H-1B population for the given period is given by ∆H it . In
most specifications, I normalize employment changes by initial employment in the
state, as is conventional in the literature (see Card 2001, Peri et al. 2014 etc.). In
unreported regressions, I perform the entire analysis without normalizing the changes
in our variables and find nearly identical results.
Note that since our specification is in first differences, we have already controlled
for permanent differences across states, which may simultaneously drive H-1B and
native hiring (e.g. initial state size). The state-specific fixed effects γi control for
differential (linear) time trends across states. Region-year fixed effects δrt account
for non-linear employment shocks to 9-Census regions12 . Thus the beta coefficients
are identified using variation in H-1B growth rates within states over time while
accounting for regional shocks common to all states in a given time period. The error
term is given by εit .
The variable Cit is an additional vector of controls. In this vector, I first include
a variable meant to capture possibly confounding shocks to labor demand arising
from the changing industrial structure of the US economy. The idea is to essentially
predict what the change in demand for a given labor type would be in state if the
12

The 9 Census regions are New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central,
South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific.
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industries in the state expanded at the same rate than their national counterparts.
These variables are commonly referred to as Bartik demand instruments –inspired
by Bartik (1991) –and are frequently accounted for in literature on immigration that
takes the metropolitan area as the unit of observation (see Peri et al. 2014 and
Wozniak and Murray 2012).
A second control takes accounts for flows of other immigrant types that may affect
native employment but also correlate with H-1B hiring. These variables are the commonly referred to as “shift-share” or “supply-push” instruments developed by Card
(2001). The main idea is to approximate what the inflow of immigrants into a state
would be, based solely on national trends in immigration and the fact that immigrants
tend to cluster together geographically. Finally, I account for changes in the national
skill composition of US workers that may affect subsequent changes in skilled and
STEM employment across states. Below, I give a more detailed explanation of how I
construct these variables.
Data on employment counts and characteristics of US natives are drawn from the
5% 1990 and 2000 US Censuses and the 1% American Community Surveys for 20012009. The data are publicly available from the Minnesota Population Center website.
My panel consists of 50 US states. I restrict the sample to non-institutionalized
workers over 17 years of age but less than 65, which are not currently in school. See
the appendix for detailed instructions on how I construct the variables used in this
study.

2.4

Identification and Instrumental Variables Strategy
While specification (2.1) includes an extensive set of controls, it may still be

the case that other unobserved time-varying shocks to native labor demand also
influence the demand for skilled foreign workers– in which case we fail to capture the
causal relationship of interest. For example, it may be the case that latent shocks to
productivity in a state increase labor demand for all labor types, drive up wages and
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induce H-1B workers to apply for positions in the state. Thus, these latent shocks
will induce a positive correlation between the H-1B flows that we observe and native
labor demand. As noted by Kerr and Lincoln (2010), however, the direction of the
bias in the estimates is ambiguous. States experiencing negative productivity shocks
may increase H-1B hiring to compensate for native outflows.
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, I introduce two variations of the empirical
strategy of Kerr and Lincoln (2010)13 . Kerr and Lincoln use the changes in the cap
mentioned above to identify the effect of the H-1B program on the rate of patenting
and employment. To get variation across cities, the authors use the fact that there
are large differences in the intensity in which cities use H-1B labor. In a reduced-form
framework, they test whether increases in the H-1B population – induced by changes
in the cap – had a stronger effect on cities that were initially more “dependent” on
the program14 . Some cities are more exposed to H-1Bs than others because their
production technology requires more intensive use of H-1B inputs. For example,
since the H-1B visa grants working rights to college-educated workers, we would
expect cities intensive in college-educated labor always to request more workers. As
well, cities with a large presence of firms with ties to foreign countries or with large
pre-existing ethnic enclaves may find less costly to find and recruit foreign workers.
The instruments I develop in this paper generate variation in H-1Bs across states
and over time in a similar fashion. The instruments combine differences across states
in their initial dependence on the program and changes in the nationwide supply of
visas which is likely exogenous to labor demand conditions in any given state.
The first instrument, which most closely resembles the Kerr-Lincoln approach,
exploits the decline in the aggregate supply of visas available induced by the lowering
13

This approach is a variant of the “supply-push” instrument of Card (2001), which is the standard
instrumental variables strategy in the literature.
14
The Kerr-Lincoln reduced-form regression is given by:
yit = αi + µt + βDi × log(Ht ) + it
where yit is the log of the outcome variable, Ht is an estimate of the size of the national H-1B
population and Di is a proxy for the employment share of H-1Bs in a city. Di is measured as the
ratio of yearly-mean of LCAs filed in 2001-2002 to employment.
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of the cap in 2004 from 195,000 to 65,000. I measure dependency for state i, Di , as
the ratio of total visas granted from 2000 to 2002, hi0 , to employment in the year
2000, E2000 . The first instrument is given by

dit
hi0
∆H
= IVit1 = Di × Dt =
× Dt
E2000
E2000

(2.2)

Where Dt is a dummy that equals 0 for the 2000-2003 period and 1 for the 20032009 period.
As shown below, the first instrument is an excellent predictor of the within-state
change in H-1B visas in our period of study. It is possible, however, to improve
its predictive power by leveraging an additional source of variation in the national
component of the instrument. For the second instrument, which is unique to this
paper, I use changes in the availability of visas caused by changes in visa demand by
the largest industry employer of H-1Bs15 . As I document in more detail below, the
share of visas granted to the largest H-1B employer – Computers Systems Design and
Management, Scientific and Technical Consulting Services (“IT firms” or “IT”)—is
substantial, and it fluctuates greatly during the timeframe of this study.16 Given
that the USCIS grants visas on a first-come-first-served basis and visas are in limited
supply, firms compete with one another for available visas. An increase in demand
by IT firms disproportionately reduces the total number of visas available to other
sectors (“non-IT firms”), and this increase is arguably exogenous to any particular
industry. The reduction in visas is larger for more dependent industries within the
non-IT sector. With this in mind, I construct an instrument for H-1B employment
in non-IT sectors within a state. Consequently, we now test for employment effects
on the non-IT native labor force.
15

17

The second instrument considers changes in the availability of visas to a set of firms that occurs
even when the level of the cap remains fixed.
16
IT and Management Consultants are classified as NAICS 5415 and 5416.
17
A concern in using this approach is that our results may not be sufficiently general because we
constrain our sample to non-IT workers. As I report below, the employment estimates obtained by
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As before, the instrument combines an industry’s dependence on the program with
a variable measured at the national level. The latter variable captures changes in the
supply of visas determined by the degree of competitiveness in the market for visas
stemming from the level of IT demand.
The second instrument is given by

noIT
hnoIT
∆Hi2000
= IVit2 = i0 × sIT
t
E2000
E2000

(2.3)

where sIT
is the IT share of total H-1B visas granted nationally in a given subt
period. The superscript in a states’ dependency to the H-1B program,

hnoIT
i0
E2000

, denotes

that we construct the variable with data on H-1B employment in non-IT sectors.
I now provide some descriptive evidence motivating the second instrumental variable approach. Figure 2.1 describes the percentage of H-1B petitions subject to the
cap for the top 25 4-digit NAICS sectors, using data on all initial H-1B visas from
1998 to 2011, which amount to over 2.5 million petitions.18 The figure reveals that H1Bs are highly concentrated in a few sectors with business services sectors employing
almost 80 percent of all applicants19 . More importantly, Figure 2.1 underscores the
central role played by IT firms in the H-1B program. IT firms take about half of all
petitions filed in the period with over 400,000 initial petitions and close to 1 million
total petitions. Highlighting the importance of the IT sector in the H-1B program is
that it receives eight times more visas than the second largest recipient, Architectural
and Engineering Services.
Figure 2.2 documents the evolution of visas granted to IT and non-IT firms from
1998 to 2011. When the cap is increased in the late 1990’s, visas for both groups also
increased. At the onset of the dot-com recession, we see a large fall in visas granted
focusing only on non-IT workers within a state are strikingly similar –in both sign and magnitude—to
the estimates obtained when using the full sample.
18
The figure excludes Healthcare and Education which became fully or partially exempt from the
cap through the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000.
19
As well, we see that many H-1Bs are employed by IT capital producers with about 6 percent of
petitions accruing to the computer and communications manufacturing 3-digit NAICS subsector.
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to both groups. The decrease for IT firms was much larger with visas granted falling
in a single year from close to 100,000 to around 30,000. This large fall in demand is
mostly responsible for the large gap in 2002 and 2003 between visas granted and the
cap. During this time in which the cap is not binding, demand by non-IT sectors is
stable at around 58,000. When IT demand bounces back in 2004, it is met with a
lower supply of visas as the cap reverts to 65,000 visas per year. As a result, the cap
becomes binding once again. From 2004 to 2008 we see a monotonic decrease in visas
granted to other sectors from around 53,000 to just below 30,000. As IT demand
plummets at the onset of the Great Recession, however, we see an immediate jump in
visas granted to other sectors likely as a result of the increase in the residual supply
of visas.
It is possible that a decline in non-IT labor demand, and not the increase in
competition for visas by IT firms, led to fewer visas granted to non-IT. Figure 2.4
presents evidence against this possible scenario. The figure shows trends in Labor
Condition Applications, a prerequisite in the application process, submitted by IT
Consultants and other sectors from 2003 to 2011. Unlike the form I-129, the LCA is
recorded irrespective of whether the applicant receives the-the visa or not. We see that
demand for both groups always move in the same direction and are both increasing
from 2004 to 2008. Relative demand, though, falls monotonically. It appears visas
granted to non-IT decreased during this time because demand by IT firms increased
more rapidly. When the Great Recession begins, demand drops across the board,
but as shown in Figure 2.2, the actual number of visas granted to non-IT sectors
increases. This behavior is indicative of a scenario in which non-IT firms are highly
constrained before the recession. Although their total demand falls, demand after the
recession is still larger than the number of visas they had obtained in the past and
thus the number of visas granted to non-IT increase from the previous year.
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2.5

First Stage
I now test the predictive power of my set of instruments. For both instruments, I

report first stage estimates for each instrument separately and then estimates obtained
from including both instruments in the first stage simultaneously. Initially, I present
estimates of our first stage where our only control is the state-specific fixed effects. I
then include a stricter set of controls and test for sample selection to reduce concerns
that the instruments are correlated with the error term in (2.1).
To compare the performance of the IV employed in the literature (the “first instrument”) with that of the IV introduced in this paper (the “second instrument”),
I test the predictive power of the first instrument on the sample of non-IT workers.
In unreported regressions, I show that the first instrument behaves nearly identically
when we use the full sample of workers.
Accordingly, our first stage regression is the following:

hnoIT
hnoIT
hnoIT
it
i0
= γi + π1
× Dt + π2 i0
× sIT
t + ρC it + it
Ei,2000
Ei,2000
Ei,2000

(2.4)

where the variables are as previously defined for 50 states over the 2000-2009
interval. To gauge the relative importance of each instrument, I scale all variables
by their sample standard deviation. We expect that as the cap tightens and as
IT consulting demand increases, states that are initially more exposed will suffer
relatively larger losses in H-1Bs. I find support for this hypothesis if both π1 < 0
and π 2 < 0 .
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.2 present the first stage estimates for the first and
second instruments, respectively. Each row reports the results of a difference specification varying in the set of controls and the sample of state we include in the
regressions. The last column reports the number of states in each specification. I
cluster standard errors at the state-level.
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Row A presents the results controlling only for the state fixed effects. For both
instruments, the coefficient estimates are negative, as posited above. Reflecting a
strong relationship between our instruments and H-1B flows to a state is that, in
both cases, the estimated coefficients are economically meaningful, and the standard
errors are very small. This result is consistent with the scenario described above in
which the availability of visas by non-IT firms first decreases as the cap is lowered
and then once more as IT demand picks up. Because of this, compared to IT firms,
non-IT firms have an even harder time obtaining visas in the 2003-2010 period.
In Row B, I introduce the region-year fixed effects and the Bartik control for
college-educated workers. Point estimates remain nearly identical for both instruments. The remaining rows all include the Bartik controls. The standard errors in
Row B are somewhat larger than in Row A but remain very small in magnitude.
In Column 3, I present the first stage coefficients from models that include both
instruments simultaneously. In this exercise, I find that the coefficients remain the
correct sign for both instruments, and the standard errors are small and of similar
magnitude as before. Importantly, the explanatory power of both instruments combined –reflected in our r-squared coefficient– is larger than in models that include
each instrument separately.
In addition to increasing explanatory power, making use of the second instrument
has an additional advantage over the identification approach followed in the literature.
Recall that the second instrumental variables strategy differs from the literature in
that the aggregate component of the instrument reflects the degree of competitiveness
in the market for visas. One advantage of this approach is that, because the degree of
competitiveness varies from year to year, we can identify the labor market effects of
H-1Bs during time intervals when the cap remains fixed (e.g. after 2004)—and this
would not be possible in first-differenced models that also include state-specific fixed
effects because of collinearity concerns.
In Column 4, I report first stage coefficients for the second instrument estimated
from models using only the subperiods where the cap is fixed at 65,000 visas per
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year (i.e. the years in the 2004-2009 interval). The coefficients remain of similar sign
and magnitude as the estimates from models that include the 2000-2003 period. The
coefficients in this exercise are also precisely estimated as before.
Before proceeding with the sensitivity checks, I outline the construction of the
Bartik demand controls. These controls are meant to capture shifts in local labor
demand that arise from changes in the national demand for the goods produced in
that area, and may be correlated with H-1B inflows. Using similar notation and
terminology as in Peri et al. 2014, I define the sector driven employment growth for
group x in state i at period t as

Sitx =

X
m

sim,1990 ∗

x
∆ymt
ymt

(2.5)

where sim,1990 is the 1990 share of total employment in state i in sector m, and
x
∆ymt
ymt

is the normalized change of national native employment for group of workers x,

in period t. In computing the measure, I use the 223 industries that I can consistently
track over the 1990- 2009 period. Industries are categorized under the 1990 Census
classification.
To construct the low-skill immigration shift-share control for state i, we assign
a portion of the national (net) flow of low-skill immigrants from source country k
between t and t - 1, mkt to state i

based on the share of immigrants living in
P
that state in 1990, λik . The shift-share control is given by g λcg mgt . I construct the
shift-share for college-educated natives in an analogous fashion. The college-educated
native shift share is λi cit , where λi is the share of college-educated workers living in
i in 1990 and cit is the change in the college-educated population between t and t 1. I normalize both variables by employment in the year 2000.
Row C checks the robustness of the results to sample selection by excluding the
top 5 largest states in the year 2000. Row D includes the control for the growth in
the national stock of college-educated workers. Finally, Row E includes the “supply-
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push” component for low-skill immigrants. The results in Rows C-E show that the
estimated coefficients for our baseline models are robust. These results are strongly
supportive of the IV mechanism posited: the lowering of the cap led to a significant
decline in the availability of visas, and this had a differential effect on states based
their initial exposure to the H-1B program. For non-IT firms, the decline in available
visas was even larger as competition from the IT sector intensified in 2003-2010 period
compared to 2000-2003.

2.6

Results
In this section, I explore whether wages and employment outcomes respond to the

H-1B program based on worker characteristics. In particular, I focus on the effect
on the opportunities college workers. I then explore whether the effects on these two
subgroups of natives differ based on their age profile.
The latter exercise, though interesting on its own, is also useful because of several
other reasons. Thus far, in the literature that examines this question by exploiting
geographic variation in outcomes, finds insignificant effects on the employment of
college and STEM workers (Kerr and Lincoln 2010, Peri et al. 2014). This finding
suggests that, even in the absence of wage gains, U.S. workers are no worse off by
changes in the H-1B policy. This conclusion may be inaccurate if the displacement of
workers takes place within these groups but the effects are masked within averages.
For instance, if young, college-educated workers are closer substitutes for H-1B labor
inputs –but perhaps complementary with those of older workers– firms may substitute
away from young natives, leading to lower employment for young workers. This result
is obscured if we simply examine total college employment.
The employment data used in this section comes from the Census for the year
2000, and the ACS for 2001-2009. The sample consists of 50 states. College workers
are those with a college degree or better. I define young workers as those less than
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30 years of age. All specifications include the state-specific fixed effects and cluster
standard errors at the state level.
Table 2.3 presents the instrumental variables results for different specifications
using our first instrument– where we include the full sample of workers when constructing our variables (i.e. we include IT workers in our state-level measures of native
employment). Column captions denote the dependent variable ∆yit for different demographic subgroups. Specifically, Column 1 shows the estimate for total college
employment and Column 2 the estimate for college employment of young workers
(those with less than 30 years of age).
The first rows of Table 2.3 present the baseline results which controls for statespecific fixed effects, the Bartik controls, and the region-year fixed effects for our nine
Census regions. First, let us focus on the result for total employment in Column 1.
The coefficient is negative but not estimated precisely. These results are similar to
those found in the literature which finds no employment effects of high-skilled immigrants by comparing local labor markets (Kerr and Lincoln 2010, Peri et al. 2014).
Column 2, however, now shows a negative estimate for the effects on employment
of young college natives. The coefficient of -2.39 is economically meaningful and is
estimated precisely (the standard error is .66).
To test whether our results are driven primarily by outliers, Row C removes the
five largest state. Rows D and E include the low-skill immigrant shift-share and the
native college-educated shift-share, respectively. Neither of these choices changes the
magnitude or precision of the estimates by much.
Table 2.4 mirrors Table 2.3, but now we now we also instrument our regressor
with the second instrument. Thus, our analysis excludes IT consultants when we
construct both our dependent and explanatory variables, as well as our instruments.
In Columns 1 and 2, I report the results for the first instrument. The estimates in
shown in these columns are qualitatively identical as those in Table 2.3. As before,
we do not see an effect for total college employment but find a negative impact on
employment of the young. The results differ in that now the coefficient estimates are
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slightly smaller. The coefficient for young college natives is now in the neighborhood
of -3. In Columns 3 and 4, I report the results for the first instrument. The point
estimates are qualitatively the same as those found in Columns 1 and 3, respectively,
although the magnitude of the coefficients differs in some cases. The main difference
lies in how precisely the coefficients are estimated. While the coefficient is significant
in the baseline model, once we include the set of controls the standard errors become a
bit larger. Though there are many reasons why these effects are sometimes imprecisely
estimated, and in some cases may be smaller in magnitude (e.g. the effect varies at
the sector level) it is reassuring to find the same qualitative results when we focus on
the non-IT population.

2.7

Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that because younger skilled natives and H-1B workers are

close in the education-experience space, they are most likely to experience negative
effects from increases in H-1B inflows. I identify the effects by using differences
in outcome growth across 50 states over the 2000-2009 period. To deal with the
endogeneity of immigrant inflows, I have used an instrumental variable strategy that
takes advantage of the fact that (1) H-1B visas became more difficult to obtain in
2003-2010 than in 2000-2003 and (2) states differ in how intensively they use H-1Bs
in production.
Consistent with previous work, I find no evidence of employment effects on collegeeducated workers when considering all workers irrespective of their age. I find, however, that young natives are affected negatively by H-1Bs. My estimates imply that
increasing the growth rate of H-1B workers by one percentage point of total employment point decreases the growth rate of college-educated native employment by
2-4 percentage points of total employment. These results suggest that young skilled
workers are more substitutable with H-1B workers than older natives.
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Fig. 2.1.. H-1B Applications by Detailed Sector, 1998-2010
Notes: The figure reports the percentage of total H-1B petitions for the top 25 minor
sectors (4-digit NAICS) for over 2.5 million approved H-1B applications for 1998-2010. The
data used includes initial approved H-1Bs as well as those for continuing employment. The
figure excludes Healthcare and Education which became fully or partially exempt from the
cap through the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000. The
vertical gray bar denotes a break in the x-axis created to save space. Computer Systems
Design includes Computer Systems Design (NAICS 5415) and Management, Scientific and
Technical Consulting Services (NAICS 5416).
Source: Form I-129 from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
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Fig. 2.2.. IT and Non-IT H-1B visas granted for initial employment, 1998-2011
Notes: Figure 2.2 reports the evolution in initial H-1B visas granted to IT and Management
Consulting firms (“IT Firms”) and for all other firms for the 1998-2011 period. The figure
excludes the Healthcare and Education sectors which became fully or partially exempt from
the cap through the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000.
The vertical line highlights the year in which the cap was lowered from 195,000 visas to
65,000.
Source: Form I-129 from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
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Fig. 2.3.. Non-IT H-1B visas granted for initial employment, 2002-2011
Notes: Figure 2.3 reports the evolution in initial H-1B visas granted to firms other than IT
Consultants for the 2002-2011 period. The figure excludes the Healthcare and Education
sectors which became fully or partially exempt from the cap through the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000. The vertical line highlights the year
in which the cap was lowered from 195,000 visas to 65,000.
Source: Form I-129 from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
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Fig. 2.4.. IT and Non-IT Labor Condition Applications, 2003-2011
Notes: Figure 2.4 reports the evolution in Labor Condition Applications (LCA) submitted
to IT and Management Consulting firms (“IT Firms”) and for all other firms for the 20032011 period. The table also presents the ratio of Non-IT to IT LCAs.
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Table 2.1.. Age Profile of H-1B workers in 2000

Initial Petitions in FY 2000
Age

Total

%

<=20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
56-60
61-65
>=65

514
37713
52070
25169
11840
5129
2332
1060
432
123
380

0.4
27.6
38.1
18.4
8.7
3.8
1.7
0.8
0.3
0.1
0.3

Notes: The table reports the age composition of initial H-1B petitions in FY 2000.
Source: Form I-129 from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service

-0.55***
(0.03)
0.845
-0.37***
(0.09)
0.640
-0.56***
(0.03)
0.846
-0.56***
(0.03)
0.846

(B) Full model ( Including region-year FE + Bartik Controls)

(C) drop top 5 state

(D) College Native Control

(E) Non-College Immigrant Controls

-1.41***
(0.44)
0.858

-1.41***
(0.08)
0.858

-1.12***
(0.13)
0.698

-1.42***
(0.08)
0.854

-1.40***
(0.07)
0.811

(3)

IV2

0.70

-0.98***
(0.20)

-0.30***
-0.83***
(0.04)
(0.33)
0.916

-0.30***
-0.83***
(0.02)
(0.07)
0.916

-0.07
(0.15)

-0.30***
-0.83***
(0.02)
(0.07)
0.915

-0.26***
-0.88***
(0.02)
(0.08)
0.886

IV1

-1.03***
(0.10)
0.771

-1.03***
(0.10)
0.771

-1.23**
(0.28)
0.520

-1.02***
(0.10
0.771

-1.10***
(0.11)
0.700

(4)

IV2 (post-2004)

500

500

450

500

500

(5)

N

Notes: Columns 1-2 in Table 2.2 present the first stage coefficients for the first and second instruments, respectively. Each row represents a different specification. The
dependent variable is the number of initial H-1Bs granted for the appropriate subperiod. In Column 3, I present the first stage coefficients from models that include both
instruments simultaneously. Column 4 shows estimates for the second instrument for the subperiods after 2004– where the H-1B cap binds and is fixed at 65,000 visas per
year. Row B shows the baseline specification which includes state and region-year fixed effects, and the Bartik for the appropriate groupwhich is included in all subsequent
rows. Row C drops the top 5 largest states in 2000. Row D controls for the national growth in the supply of college-educated workers. Row E controls for the shift-share
of immigrants without a college degree. All specifications are unweighted. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

R-Squared

R-Squared

R-Squared

R-Squared

R-Squared

-0.53***
(0.03)
0.753

(2)

(1)

(A) State fixed effects only

IV2

IV1

Table 2.2.. First Stage Estimates
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-8.71**
(4.39)
-4.87
(3.49)
-4.87
(3.49)

(C) drop top 5 states

(D) College Native Control

(E) Non-College Immigrant Controls

-3.01**
(1.24)

-3.01**
(1.24)

-4.46***
(2.03)

-3.04**
(1.23)

500

500

450

500

(3)
500

N

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.3 present the instrumental variable results for the first instrument using as the dependent variable the employment of total and young
college-educated workers as described on the column heading. The last column reports the number of state-year observations in each specification. Employment data are
from the 2000 Census and the ACS for 2001-2009. Row A shows the baseline specification which includes state fixed effects. Row B includes region-year fixed effects and
includes the Bartik for the appropriate groupwhich is included in all subsequent rows. Row C drops the top 5 largest states in 2000. Row D controls for the national
growth in the supply of college-educated workers. Row E controls for the shift-share of immigrants without a college degree. All specifications are unweighted. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level.

-4.72
(3.45)

(B) Full model ( Including region-year FE + Bartik Controls)

(A) State fixed effects only

IV1
Employment: College Educated
Total
Young
(1)
(2)
0.77
-2.39***
(1.90)
(0.66)

Table 2.3.. Change in Initial H-1B visas granted between 2000-2010: First Instrument
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-4.44
(4.49)
-2.15
(3.18)
-1.90
(3.28)

(C) drop top 5 states

(D) College Native Control

(E) Non-College Immigrant Controls

-3.40**
(1.22)

-3.13**
(1.26)

-3.22*
(1.91)

-3.15**
(1.24)

3.39
(10.36)

3.46
(10.38)

1.89
(16.04)

3.57
(10.33)

-3.04
(4.57)

-3.07
(4.59)

-0.44
(6.44)

-3.14
(4.52)

IV2
Employment: College Educated
Total
Young
(3)
(4)
1.02
-5.63***
(5.44)
(2.27)

500

500

450

500

(5)
500

N

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.3 present the instrumental variable results for the first instrument using as the dependent variable the employment of total and young
college-educated workers as described on the column heading. Columns 3 and 4 present the estimates for the second instrument. In all columns, results are presented
for models where I exclude IT and Management Consultants in the construction of all variables. The last column reports the number of state-year observations in each
specification. Employment data are from the 2000 Census and from the ACS for 2001-2009. Row A shows the baseline specification which includes state fixed effects. Row
B includes region-year fixed effects and includes the Bartik for the appropriate groupwhich is included in all subsequent rows. Row C drops the top 5 largest states in
2000. Row D controls for the national growth in the supply of college educated workers. Row E controls for the shift-share of immigrants without a college degree. All
specifications are unweighted. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

-2.02
(3.21)

(B) Full model (Including region-year FE + Bartik Controls)

(A) State fixed effects only

IV1
Employment: College Educated
Total
Young
(1)
(2)
4.19*
-2.27***
(2.38)
(0.70)

Table 2.4.. Change in Initial H-1B visas granted between 2000-2010: First and Second Instruments
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3. SKILLED IMMIGRANTS AND SERVICE
OFFSHORING IN US INDUSTRIES
3.1

Introduction
In recent decades, technological change in information and communications tech-

nology (ICT) has made increasingly feasible for businesses to offshore service activities (Freud and Weinhold 2002). As a consequence, US service trade has increased
dramatically and has greatly outpaced growth in manufacturing trade (Amiti and
Wei 2009). Alongside the rapid increase in service offshoring, there has been a large
increase in the employment of skilled immigrants by US businesses. From 1998 to
2006, the number of H-1B visa holders – a key source of skilled immigration to the
US—nearly doubled increasing from 261,000 to 500,000 (Borjas 2014).
How has the rising popularity of these two business practices affected the labor
market prospects of US workers? The answer to this question is strongly debated by
the public and has been addressed extensively in the literature. Instead, this study
focuses on a related question that has received much less attention: how has the rise
of skilled immigration affected service offshoring? Note that hiring skilled immigrants
may lead to higher or lower offshoring so that the direction of overall effect is unclear.
As noted by critics of globalization, in some industries such as information technology,
cost savings from offshoring and from hiring H-1Bs are similar in magnitude, and thus,
firms can use both types of labor somewhat interchangeably (Matloff 2004). In this
case, higher immigration leads to lower offshoring by the firm. However, there is
also evidence that, in some industries, immigration may facilitate offshoring as H-1Bs
assist as liaisons to offshore workers or are themselves offshore workers provisionally
in the US for training purposes (Matloff 2004).
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In this paper, I empirically evaluate how hiring skilled immigrants by an industry
affects service offshoring. Establishing this causal relationship is difficult because
variation in input choice across industries –whether from domestic or foreign sources–
likely depends on the relative economic conditions industries are experiencing. For
instance, a shock to productivity in an industry likely raises demand for all inputs
rendering immigrant hiring endogenous to offshoring. To deal with this issue, I exploit
variation in H-1B hiring caused by policy changes that took place during 1995-2007.
During this time, H-1B hiring increased dramatically as the limit on the number of
visas issued each year was raised from 65,000 to 195,000 and then lowered to the
original 65,000. These national changes had differential effects on industries because
some industries were initially more exposed to the H-1B program.
My analysis requires yearly data on H-1B hiring by industry. Unfortunately, these
data are not available to the public. I obtain administrative data on approved H-1B
visas from the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) under a Freedom
of Information Act Request. From these data, I generate industry-level summaries of
H-1B employment and link them to a variant of the metric of industry offshoring first
developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999). The service offshoring measure combines
data on service imports at the economy-wide level with data on intermediate use from
input-output accounts. This metric has been used by Amiti and Wei (2005) and Crino
(2009) in papers that examine the impacts of service offshoring on US productivity
and labor markets.
My empirical approach consists of regressing service offshoring by industry on
a measure of industry exposure to skilled immigration. The analysis employs data
on 205 4-digit NAICS US industries for the period from 1995-2007. I find a positive and statistically significant relationship between skilled immigration and service
offshoring. My 2SLS estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in industry exposure to skilled immigration leads to a .35 standard deviation increase in
service offshoring. In the 2000-2001 period, my estimates imply that service offshoring
growth is close to 1 percentage point higher for an industry in the 90th percentile of
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exposure than for an industry in the 10th percentile. These findings are robust to different variable definitions and to controlling for industry output and industry-specific
time trends. These findings are in agreement with a setting in which higher high-skill
immigration decreases service offshoring costs and thus increases service offshoring
by US firms.
This paper is most closely related to a small line of research that considers how
immigration affects offshoring (Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright 2010; Barba Navaretti,
Bertola, and Sambenelli 2008). I contribute to this literature by focusing on skilled immigration as opposed to immigration in general and by considering service offshoring
instead of merchandise offshoring. This paper is also related to a literature that studies the effects of skilled immigration on economic outcomes in the US (Pekkala Kerr,
Kerr and Lincoln 2014; Peri, Shih, and Sparber 2014, 2015; Kerr and Lincoln 2010;
Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010; Moser, Voena and Waldinger 2012; Borjas and Doran 2012). Lastly, this paper also relates to a literature that examines how foreign
workers –while still in their home country– impact the labor market opportunities of
US workers through service offshoring (Amiti and Wei 2009; Crino 2009).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background on the H-1B program and describes the data used in the study. Sections III and IV discuss measurement, sections V and VI the empirical strategy and identification issues. Section VII
presents the results and various robustness exercises. Section VIII concludes.

3.2

Background and H-1B data
As described below, I will measure offshoring at the industry level, and thus we

will need industry-level data on H-1B workers. The following section provides relevant
background information on the H-1B program to understand better the data and the
institutional details that underpin my identification strategy. Finally, I document the
industry composition of H-1B employment.
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3.2.1

General Background

The H-1B visa is a temporary visa that reserved for skilled foreign workers in
professions that “require theoretical or technical expertise in specialized fields”. Scientists and engineers fall into this category as well as accountants and medical doctors.
With few exceptions, most H-1B recipients have at least a bachelor’s degree and are
concentrated in just a few occupations. As is well documented, H-1B workers are
concentrated in STEM occupations with the lion’s share being in computer-related
occupations (Kerr and Lincoln 2010). In my data, roughly 70 percent of H-1B applicants work in STEM fields, with 55 percent in computer-related occupations.

3.2.2

The Cap

In 1990, the US Congress set a numerical limit of 65,000 on the number of visas
that can be issued in a given year. This limit –usually referred to as the “cap”—has
changed over time. Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the numerical cap from 1990
to 2008, as well as the actual number of cap-bound visas granted during the period.
By the middle of the decade, the cap became binding and was provisionally increased
to over 100,000 workers for fiscal years 1999 and 200012 . The cap was further raised
to 195,000 for the 2001-2003 period. During this time, the cap did not bind as visa
demand fell, which led to the cap being lowered back to 65,000 in 2004. Ever since
2004, the cap has been reached every year, even though an extra 20,000 visas were
allocated to foreign workers with graduate degrees from universities in the United
States.34
1

Knowing this also tells you that creating the measure in 1998 is before the cap ws lifted
Under the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement act of 1998
3
Under the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, government and
some nonprofit research organizations, as well as universities, became exempt from the cap so that
the number of visas issued exceeds the cap in many years. In my data, I cannot distinguish which
visas are cap-exempt. In Figure 3.1, I report an approximate number of cap-bound visas issued by
excluding firms in Healthcare and Education from the computation.
4
For FY 2006, however, an additional 20,000 additional visas were reserved for workers with graduate
degrees from US universities.
2
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3.2.3

Application Process and Data

The application process requires a potential recipient to be sponsored by her
prospective employer, and thus the firm and the H-1B worker meet in advance.5 Once
the employer-employee match occurs, the firm must file a form I-129, “Petition for a
Nonimmigrant Worker” with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS).
The USCIS approves the petition if admission conditions are met and the cap has
not been reached (GAO 2011).6 Petitions are approved on a first-come-first-served
basis, irrespective of firm or worker characteristics such as industry or occupation.
Visas are issued for three years after which the employer can apply for a three-year
extension, and this requires filing for a new I-129, though extensions are not subject
to the cap.
As previously mentioned, my empirical approach requires data on H-1B employment/wages by industry. Unfortunately, industry employment counts are not known
because the government agencies tasked with administering the program do not keep
track of H-1B stock, whether at the national level or the industry level (GAO 2011).7
Instead, I use microdata on all newly cap-bound visas to approximate yearly changes
in H-1B employment for a given industry, and thus I estimate my empirical models in
first differences. Data on newly issued visas are taken from the form I-129. Because
these records are not readily available to the public, I obtain the data from the USCIS
under a Freedom of Information Act request. Each I-129 record contains information
on the name, 4-digit NAICS industry and location of the sponsoring firm. Moreover,
the records contain information on wages, age, country of origin, and occupation of
the H-1B recipient. The data span the 1998 to 2012 period.
5

This can be done in a multitude of ways. For instance, firms can recruit foreigners already in the
US as students or from abroad through foreign affiliates and other sources.
6
If the worker is already in the U.S., the USCIS changes their previous visa status to H-1B and
the worker may begin working immediately. Otherwise, the worker takes the approved I-129 to a
consular office of the Department of State which reviews the entire package and issues the visa.
7
There are national estimates of the H-1B population, however. Influential work by Kerr and Lincoln
(2010) uses an estimate of the population developed by Lowell (2000). Estimating the population
requires combining H-1B gross inflow data with assumptions about the rates at which the stock is
depleted.
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3.2.4

Sectoral Composition

Figure 3.2 describes the sector composition of H-1B workers subject to the cap.
To construct the figure, I use the I-129 data on over 2.5 million petitions approved
H-1B visas from 1998 to 2010.8 The figure underscores why hiring H-1B workers has
the potential to have an immediate impact on service offshoring in the US. Around
80 percent of H-1B workers are employed by firms in the professional and business
services (PBS), financial, and information sectors. These services can be performed
remotely and thus are tradable. Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of H-1B petitions
for the top 25 4-digit NAICS employer industries. The pattern outlined in Figure
3.3 further documents that the H-1B program is primarily used by firms in tradable
services industries. On this list, 20 industries fall under the tradeable service industry
category.

3.3

Measuring Offshoring Shocks
Ideally, we would want to measure offshoring at the industry level using data on

imports of intermediate inputs by industry. These data, however, are not readily
available because the value of imported intermediates consumed by any given US
industry is not known. To deal with this issue, I obtain its proxy (of f it ) by combining
data on intermediate use from input-output accounts –which unfortunately do not
distinguish between domestic and foreign supply sources – with data on economywide imports. The idea is then to distribute economy-wide imports across domestic
industries based the industry’s exposure to inputs of a given type, irrespective of the
location of the supplier. This approach to measuring offshoring was pioneered by
Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
I construct my measure of offshoring by industry, of f it , as follows: I first estimate
the value of imported intermediates bought at time t by national industry i from
8

The figure does not include visas granted to Healthcare and Education because these sectors became
fully or partially exempt from the cap through the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First
Century Act of 2000
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foreign industry j ( M̃ijt ). I do this by scaling the national value of imports from
foreign industry j (IN jt ) –from all country sources–by the pre-sample share of output
from industry j that is consumed by industry i, αij0 =

Nij0
,
Yj0

where Yj0 is output in

industry j, and Nij0 is the value of intermediates consumed by i from j, from both
domestic and foreign suppliers. Then, M̃ijt = αij0 IN jt . The share αij0 is measured
in the pre-sample to mitigate endogeneity concerns as in Crino (2009).
The second step is to obtain the total value of imported intermediates for each
industry i, M̃it , by summing over all service industries j that supply to i. Specifically,

M̃it =

X
j

M̃ijt =

X

αij0 IN jt

(3.1)

j

As mentioned in the previous section, we will measure H-1B shocks in first differences
due to data constraints. Accordingly, we will also measure offshoring in first differences. The final step in assembling our offshoring metric is to first difference M̃it and
then normalize it by total intermediate input usage in i, Nit , so that ∆of f it =

∆M̃it
Nit

.

This choice of normalization follows Crino (2010). 9 Data on the value of intermediates
purchased (Nij0 and N it ) and output ( Y i0 ) are taken from the annual input-output
(IO) use tables from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), where, N ij0 , is the use
value in 1995, and Y i0 is output in 1995 . Data on IN jt are taken from the US
International Services tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for 19
four-digit NAICS industries.
9

10

In the appendix, I document some summary statis-

In some cases, the normalizing variable is industry output instead of total intermediate usage. The
results do not change significantly based on this choice of normalization.
10
The 19 industries are the following: Software publishers; Telecommunications; Data processing,
hosting, related services, and other information services; Securities, commodity contracts, and other
financial investments and related activities; Insurance carriers; Agencies, brokerages, and other insurance related activities; Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles; Automotive equipment rental
and leasing; Consumer goods rental and general rental centers; Commercial and industrial machinery and equipment rental and leasing; Lessors of nonfinancial intangible assets (except copyrighted
works);Legal services; Accounting, tax preparation, bookkeeping, and payroll services; Architectural, engineering, and related services; Specialized design services; Computer systems design and
related services; Management, scientific, and technical consulting services; Scientific research and
development services; Advertising and related services.
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tics of the offshoring variable. In my sample of industries, the mean yearly change in
service offshoring is 0.1 percentage points, with a standard deviation of 0.5 percentage
points.

3.4

Measuring Immigration Shocks
To explain the approach I follow to measure an industry’s exposure to skilled

immigration, let us first recall that our goal is to test whether skilled immigration has
an effect on service offshoring in the US. We could carry out such test by regressing the
estimated value of offshoring carried out by a given industry –as described in (3.1)–
on the number of immigrants hired by that industry. The previous exercise, however,
encounters the following two issues. First, as mentioned above, H-1B employment is
highly concentrated in a handful of sectors. We thus will only have a handful of treated
units, and therefore our results will be strongly contingent on the industry sample
that we include in the regressions. Nonetheless, in the regression models described
below, I include measures of the direct hiring of H-1Bs by industry as controls.
More importantly, our measure of offshoring distributes national imports of a given
commodity across industries based on an industry’s consumption share irrespective of
whether the supply source of that commodity is foreign or domestic. This imputation
approach seems particularly problematic given that the largest H-1B industries are
input suppliers to other domestic industries (e.g. IT services). Because of this, if
as a result of higher immigration a domestic industry outsources a task to an H1B industry, and the latter industry offshores this task to its foreign counterpart, a
fraction of the task is recorded as being offshored by the domestic industry.
To see more clearly why this issue may be problematic, consider the following
scenario. Suppose that firms in the IT services sector in the US always offshore a
portion of the work they do for their clients, perhaps because they have affiliated
parties in India where IT labor is much cheaper than in the US. Now, a relaxation
in immigration policy allows IT firms to hire more immigrants from India and, as
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a consequence, allows them to offer lower prices to their customers in the US.11 In
response to lower IT prices, an insurance firm now decides to outsource domestically
some IT tasks previously performed in-house. The domestic IT sector then offshores
some of these tasks to the foreign IT sector.
In this scenario, higher immigrant employment in the IT sector leads to higher
within-industry input trade in IT, and thus national imports of IT services rise. Now,
our measure of offshoring distributes national IT imports across all industries that use
IT services as inputs. Thus, as imports of IT services rise so does measured offshoring
in the insurance sector, and also in all other sectors downstream in the supply chain
from IT. Because of this, regressing measured offshoring by industry on immigrant
employment counts may return biased estimates of the true effect of immigration on
offshoring.
It is worth pausing briefly to note that hiring H-1B workers by the domestic
IT sector need not lead to higher offshoring, as in the previous example, and thus
the effect of skilled immigration on service offshoring is theoretically unclear. For
instance, it may be the case that our insurance company does not source IT inputs
strictly from domestic firms but also from foreign firms unaffiliated to domestic IT
firms. In this situation, as domestic IT prices fall in response to an increase in H1B hiring by IT firms, the insurance company substitutes away from foreign IT into
domestic IT, which leads to lower offshoring.
A simple way to account for the measurement issue just described is to assume that
part of the measured offshoring in an industry depends on how many H-1Bs it hires
directly but also on how many H-1Bs are hired by that industry’s input suppliers. To
account for the relative importance of different suppliers for a given industry, we can
construct our measure of an industry’s exposure to immigration by taking a similar
approach to the one we followed to construct (3.1) above. The idea is to distribute
a sector’s H-1B employment across industries based on an industry’s consumption
share of inputs from that sector.
11

This is perhaps because IT offshoring costs depend on the size of foreign employment in the IT
sector.
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I construct my measure of immigrant exposure by industry i, IDit as follows: I first
estimate the number of H-1Bs employed in industry j that are indirectly employed
by industry i ( IDH ijt ). Since we are measuring our variables in changes, I do this
by scaling the annual change in H-1B employment in industry j between t and t1 (∆H jt ) by the pre-sample share of output from industry j that is consumed by
industry i, αij0 =

Nij0
,
Yj0

where Yj0 is output in industry j in 1995, and Nij0 is the

value of intermediates consumed by i from j in 1995, as previously defined. Then,
IDH ijt = αij0 ∆H jt .
The second step is to sum over all service industries j that supply to i. Specifically,

IDH it =

X

IDH ijt =

j

X

αij0 ∆H jt

(3.2)

j

Finally, as before, we normalize by total intermediate inputs by i, Nit , so that
∆IDit

=

IDH it
Nit

. I proxy for ∆Hjt using the number of cap-bound visas for initial

employment that are granted to sector j at time t. The data come from the sources
previously noted.

3.5

Instrumental Variables Approach
My empirical methodology regresses our measure service offshoring on the mea-

sure of immigration exposure just described. Unfortunately, the OLS estimates of
such regression may be biased because, for example, it may be the case that latent
(possibly time-varying) factors that affect an industry’s decision to offshore also affect
H-1B employment by that industry’s suppliers. To fix ideas, consider the following
scenario. Assume that technical change takes place in the financial services industry.
In response, the industry offshores more IT services but also decides to outsource
some of these services domestically, which induces the domestic IT industry to hire
more H-1B workers to meet higher demand.
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To deal with this potential issue, I construct instruments that leverage variation
in H-1B flows that depend on (1) the level of admissions set by the government
and (2) macroeconomic conditions that are arguably exogenous to offshoring shocks
to any given industry. These national shocks have a different impact on industries
because some industries are always more exposed to the H-1B program than others.
The intuition for the instrument is as follows. For some reason, some industries
always want to hire more H-1Bs than others. For example, because of differences in
production technology some industries always use more STEM labor than others so
that their quantity of H-1Bs demanded is always higher: IT consulting firms always
demand more H-1B workers than firms in finance.12 When national shocks to the
supply or the demand for visas hit the market, these firms are more affected by the
common shock.
To help us describe the construction of the instruments, and its identification
assumptions, let us first consider the following simplified model of H-1B industry
employment in a setting where the national demand for visas exceeds supply and thus
the cap binds in a given year. Abstracting away from the timing of the application,
and because visas are granted independently of the industry of the applicant, we can
approximate the number of newly hired H-1Bs by industry i in year, hit , with the
following quantity

appit
capt
hit = P
× capt = appit × P
j appjt
j appjt

(3.3)

where appit stands for visa demand (i.e. the number of applications industry i
P
submits in year t). The level of the cap is given by the term capt , and j appjt
is national demand. From the previous expression we see that H-1B hiring by an
industry depends on how competitive the application process is in that given year,
12

Other industry characteristics may also generate these differences. For example, some industries
have stronger ties to foreign countries perhaps because firms in the industry have affiliated partners
in those countries. For firms in these industries it is less costly to find and recruit foreign workers
and thus hire relatively more of them.
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which is represented by the ratio,

Pcapt .
j appjt

An increase in national demand, or a

decrease in the level of the cap, makes it more difficult to obtain visas in a given year.
As well, from (3.3) we see that industries that demand a larger number of visas will
tend to hire more workers.
I model industry i’s visa demand at time t as

appit = ci0 + it

(3.4)

where ci0 is a fixed term which captures stable differences in H-1B demand across
industries. The second term in (3.4) is a time-varying component that captures shocks
to labor demand and is possibly correlated with offshoring shocks.
Substituting the previous expression into (3.3) yields

capt
capt
capt
hit = appit × P
= ci0 × P
+ it × P
j appjt
j appjt
j appjt
Note that cio ×

Pcapt
j appjt

(3.5)

is independent of time-varying industry-specific labor

demand shocks it and can be used as an instrumental variable for hit . Since cio
is unobservable, I proxy for it using hi0 , the number of applications in the first year
IV
Pcapt .
available in my data, so that my instrument for hi0 , hIV
it is given by hit = hi0 ×
appjt
j

Now, because hi0 also depends on i0 , our instrument is only valid if our errors
are not correlated over time, as would be the case if for example, these same group of
industries are always more likely to experience positive shocks to offshoring. In the
next section, I try to account for this possibility by accounting for differential trends
in offshoring across industries.
With instruments for industry H-1B inflows in hand, I use a similar procedure as
above to construct the instruments for the indirect shocks, namely
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IDitIV =

X
j

αij0

hIV
it
Nit

(3.6)

As discussed in section II, the H-1B cap binds in most years. Because of this,
the expression in (3.3) is a reasonable approximation of the true development of the
H-1B inflows for most years in my data. The quantity in (3.3), however, poorly
approximates inflows for years where the cap does not bind (i.e. when the cap does
not bind the number of visas granted equals the quantity demanded, hit = appit ), as
with fiscal years 2002 and 2003 – where the cap was at its highest point.
To deal with this issue, I use the fact that during economic expansions, the most
exposed sectors increase H-1B demand at a higher rate than others. Conversely,
they also contract a higher rate. Keeping with the notation used above (i.e. appit =
ci0 + it ), we now assume that it = bi0 ×GDPt + v it , where bi0 is an industry-specific
scaling factor, GDPt is GDP at time t, vit is our error term which is potentially
correlated with offshoring shocks, and where bi0 GDPt and vit are uncorrelated. Thus
we have that H-1B demand is given by

appit = ci0 + bi0 × GDPt + v it

(3.7)

The idea is now to use bi0 GDPt as a second instrument for hit to account for the
years where the cap does not bind. As before, we proxy for bi0 with hi0 .
The scatterplot in Figure 3.4 relates the explanatory variable ∆IDit with the
instrumental variable in (3.6). Each dot stands for one of 2460 industry-year observations. The scatterplot shows a strong relationship between the two variables and thus
underscores the predictive power of the instrument. The slope of the regression line
is .48 and is estimated precisely with a robust t-statistic of 10.47. The corresponding
r-squared is .68.
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3.6

Empirical Section
I take to the data the following specifications:

∆of f it = µt + β∆IDit + αT rendsit + εit

(3.8)

where ∆of f it is the annual change in offshoring for industry i as described in
(3.3) . Period fixed effects µt control for shocks common to all industries in a given
time interval. As well, since (3.8) is expressed in first differences, we have already
accounted for permanent differences across industries that may be correlated with
our main variable but also with an industry’s level of offshoring. The error term is
given by εit . We estimate our β coefficient using 2SLS where our instruments are as
previously described. I cluster standard errors at the level of the industry.
Recall that we want to use the fact that because of fixed differences in production
technology, some industries will always be more exposed to immigration shocks than
others, and this happens independently of other factors that affect offshoring. A
concern, however, is that these fixed differences may nonetheless be correlated with
other factors that independently create the offshoring patterns that we observe. For
example, industries experiencing rapid technological change, in the years before the
increase in the H-1B cap, may have simultaneously increased their demand for foreign
inputs alongside their demand for outsourced domestic inputs, and thus H-1B demand
by their suppliers. If these positive shocks are correlated over time (i.e. if these same
set of industries continued to experience these positive technology shocks) our tests
will return upwardly biased estimates of the effect of interest.
To address this concern, I include in my regressions the vector T rendsit , which
stands for a vector of controls designed to capture trends that may correlate with
our instrument. The first element in the vector is the mean annual log change in
offshoring, from 1990 to 1995. The second element in our vector of pre-trend controls
is an industry-specific fixed effect. Since my models are estimated in first-differences,
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this latter exercise controls for linear trends in our outcomes of interest possibly
correlated with our instruments.

3.7

Results
In this section, I report the estimates of the effect of high-skilled immigration on

service offshoring in the US. I collect these estimates in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Each
column of the tables reports the estimates from a different specification of the model
in Equation (3.8) above. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the yearly
change in our offshoring measure. As well, all specifications include period fixed
effects. Specifications vary based on the mode of estimation (OLS vs. IV), on variable
construction (e.g. alternate normalization choices), and on the inclusion of additional
control (e.g. output, industry fixed effects). All specifications cluster standard errors
at the industry level. The sample spans the 1995-2007 period for 205 BLS industries
where industries are for the most part defined at the 4-digit NAICS. All variables are
normalized by their sample standard deviation to aid with the interpretation of my
estimates.
The first column of Table 3.1 shows the OLS estimates. I find that a positive correlation between skilled immigration and service offshoring. This correlation is consistent with a scenario in which greater skilled immigration lowers service offshoring
costs and thus leads to greater offshoring by US firms. Interpreting this correlation
as causal is difficult since skilled immigration is likely dependent on other factors
that independently affect offshoring. To make progress on this front, we estimate our
models using 2SLS. In Column 2, I show the baseline 2SLS estimates that include
only period fixed-effects as controls. The results remain qualitatively the same, but
now the point estimates are larger. My 2SLS estimates suggest that a one standard
deviation increase in industry exposure to skilled immigration leads to a .53 standard
deviation increase in service offshoring. In the 2000-2001 period, my estimates imply
that service offshoring growth is close to 1 percentage point higher for an industry in
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the 90th percentile of exposure than for an industry in the 10th percentile. In both
the OLS and IV estimates, the estimates are significant at the 10 percent level. Not
surprisingly given the strong relationship between the instrument and my dependent
variable described in Figure 3.4, the instruments are very strong with F-statistics
being always larger than 100.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.1, I test the robustness of the results to changes
in variable definitions and sample selection. In column 3, I normalize the offshoring
and immigration variables by industry output instead of by total intermediate usage.
The point estimates are slightly smaller in magnitude where the coefficient is now
.37. The estimates are still significant at the 10 percent level. Finding that these
results are similar is perhaps not surprising given that other studies using similar
offshoring measures have found that normalization choice seems to be of second order
importance (Crino 2010). In column 4, I test the robustness of the results to allowing
the shares αij0 to vary over time. The results are robust to this variable construction
choice with point estimates remaining of similar magnitude although the coefficients
are somewhat less precisely estimated. Column 5 drops the top most dependent
sectors regarding their exposure to skilled immigration. Column 6 includes output as
a control. In both cases, results remain qualitatively the same.
Table 3.2 presents estimates from additional robustness exercises as well as estimates of the direct effects of skilled immigration on offshoring. I obtain these direct
estimates by regressing our measure of offshoring on the normalized H-1B employment change in an industry. In Column 1 we see that our indirect effect estimates are
robust to the inclusion of the direct shock variable, as well as to estimating the model
without the 1995-1999 time interval. The direct estimates in Column 1 and Column
2, however, suggests a negative direct effect of skilled immigration on offshoring.
Though the point estimates fall in magnitude, the indirect coefficients survive
the inclusion of industry-fixed effects in Column 3, and the inclusion of output and
industry-fixed effects in Column 4. This is not the case for the direct estimates which
become insignificant once we include industry-fixed effects. The last column includes
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as a control the measure of expected offshoring growth discussed above. The inclusion
of the expected offshoring control in Column 5, however, brings my estimated indirect
effect to 0, and thus our claims that skilled immigration has a causal effect on service
offshoring should be interpreted with some caution.

3.8

Conclusion
Using new microdata on approved H-1B visas for the 1995 to 2007 period, I have

documented that the large increase in skilled immigrant employment in the US during
this period was undertaken by firms in tradeable service sectors such professional and
business services. I have then estimated the effect of this increase in immigrant employment on service offshoring by US industries. I instrument immigrant flows with
variables that leverage changes the national level of H-1B admissions and on macroeconomic conditions that are exogenous to any particular industry. I find evidence
that hiring skilled immigrants leads to higher offshoring at the industry level.
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Fig. 3.1.. The H-1B numerical cap and number of approved visas subject to the cap,
1990-2008
Notes: Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the H-1B numerical cap and the actual number of
visas issued subject to the cap for 1990-2008. The figure excludes visas issued to Healthcare
and Education because these sectors became fully or partially exempt from the cap through
the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000. Data on aggregate
visa issuances from 1990 to 1997 are taken from Kerr and Lincoln (2010). Data on aggregate
visa issuances from 1998 to 2008 are computed using data from the Form I-129
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Fig. 3.2.. H-1B Applications by Major Sector, 1998-2010
Notes: Figure 3.2 reports the major sector (two-digit NAICS) distribution of over 2.5 million
approved H-1B applications for 1998-2010. The data used includes new approved H-1Bs as
well as those for continuing employment. The figure excludes Healthcare and Education,
which became fully or partially exempt from the cap through the American Competitiveness
in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000. PBS stands for Professional and Business Services.
Source: Form I-129 from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
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Fig. 3.3.. H-1B Applications by Detailed Sector, 1998-2010
Notes: Figure 3.3 reports the percentage of total H-1B petitions for the top 25 minor sectors
(4-digit NAICS) for over 2.5 million approved H-1B applications for 1998-2010. The data
used includes new approved H-1Bs as well as those for continuing employment. The figure
excludes Healthcare and Education which became fully or partially exempt from the cap
through the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000. The
vertical gray bar denotes a break in the x-axis created to save space. Each bar representing
a minor sector is colored according to the major sector to which it belongs.
Source: Form I-129 from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
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Fig. 3.4.. Downstream shock and Instrumental Variable
Notes: The scatter plot shows the relationship between the measure of industry downstream
shocks and the instrumental variable. Each point in the scatterplot represents an industryyear pair for 185 industries for 1995-2007, excluding the years when the cap does not bind
(i.e. 2002 and 2003). The downstream shock is scaled by 100 to improve readability. The
t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors.
Source: Form I-129 from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
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0.53**
(2.20)
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Notes: Each column in Table 3.1 shows the results from industry-year regressions where the dependent variable is the change in offshoring from 1995 to 2007. To construct
the H-1B indirect exposure measure, I first multiply the direct shocks to the industrys suppliers with their share in total intermediate input costs, and then sum across all
suppliers. Direct shocks are defined as the change in the H-1B wage bill normalized by industry output. The first instrumental variable for downstream shocks interacts the
indirect dependency measure with the cap. The second instrument interacts indirect dependency with a dummy that equals 1 for the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 intervals.
Indirect dependencies are constructed using data on H-1B visas issued in 1998-1999 and data from the 1997 Benchmark IO tables. Column 1 shows the OLS estimate.
Column the baseline 2SLS estimate. Column 3 normalizes variables by industry output instead of by total intermediate use. Column 4 lets the shares αij0 vary over time
when constructing the variables. Column 5 drops the top most dependent sectors regarding their exposure to skilled immigration. The specification in column 6 includes
output as a control. All specifications are unweighted and include period and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
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488.18

0.48*
(1.91)

(5)

No
2665
205.00
511.34

No
2665
205.00
X

0.37**
(2.06)

(4)

Industry Fixed Effects
Number of observations
Number of industries
F-Statistic

0.53**
(2.21)

(3)

-0.08**
(-2.38)

0.35**
(2.30)

(2)

∆Log Output

H-1B Indirect Exposure

(1)

Dependent variable: ∆Offshoring

Table 3.1.. Industry-Level Offshoring Regressions
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No
1521
192.00
122.59

-0.25**
(-2.48)

0.67**
(2.46)

(2)

Yes
2478
192.00
281.12

0.16
(0.89)

0.31*
(1.68)

(3)

Yes
2478
192
254.09

0.01
(1.26)

0.15
(0.88)

0.31*
(1.68)

(4)

No
2665
192
189.61

562.34***
(29.13)

-0.06*
(-1.78)

0.05
(0.84)

(5)

Notes: See Table 3.1. Column 1 shows the baseline 2SLS estimates for direct and indirect shocks. The specification in Column 2 includes industry-fixed effects as controls,
and Column 3 includes output and industry fixed effects. Column 4 includes as a control the measure of expected offshoring growth discussed above. The last Column
estimates the models without the 1995-1999 period. All specifications are unweighted and include period and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
industry level.

Industry Fixed Effects
Number of observations
Number of industries
F-Statistic

Mean Change in Offshoring (1993-1995)

No
2478
192.00
126.51

-0.26**
(-2.06)

Direct Exposure

∆Log Output

0.57**
(2.21)

H-1B Indirect Exposure

(1)

Dependent variable: ∆Offshoring

Table 3.2.. Industry-Level Offshoring Regressions
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100
3.10

Appendix

Table 3.3.. Summary Statistics

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Change in Offshoring

2665

0.001834

0.005786

-0.0035

0.116419

Indirect Shock

2665

0.00039

0.000429

0

0.005107

Direct Shock

2478

0.000303

0.001448

0

0.037175

VITA
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VITA
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